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Abstract 
The existence of links between personality traits, values, well-being, and self-esteem is well 
established, but the nature and direction of these links have been less clearly understood. This 
study examines longitudinally the stability of traits and values, their mutual effects, and their 
effects on affective and cognitive well-being and self-esteem. We analyzed data from a 
nationally representative panel in the Netherlands, spanning five time points spread across 
eight years (n = 5,159 to 7,021 per time point, total N = 11,890). We estimated trait-state-
error models and random-intercepts cross-lagged panel models to account for the trait-like, 
time-invariant stability of the constructs. Traits were more stable than values. The 
bidirectional effects tended to be significant, but could be distinguished by their relative size. 
Traits predicted values more strongly than they were predicted by values, and generally 
predicted well-being and self-esteem more strongly than values did. Traits predicted broad 
well-being (especially its affective aspects) more strongly than they were predicted by it; 
values, by contrast, were predicted by well-being (especially its cognitive aspects and self-
esteem) more strongly than they predicted it. The findings highlight the central role of traits 
for personality functioning, while also supporting the mutual constitution of traits and other 
personality concepts. The results are discussed in the framework of different theoretical 
approaches to the composition of the broader personality system. 
Keywords: personality traits and values; affective and cognitive well-being; self-
esteem; stability and predictive power 
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The Longitudinal Links of Personality Traits, Values, Well-Being, and Self-Esteem:  
A Five-Wave Study of a Nationally Representative Sample 
How are personality traits and values related, and how do they relate to psychological 
well-being and self-esteem? Although it has been established that these concepts are 
systematically linked (e.g., Parks-Leduc, Feldman, & Bardi, 2015; Steel, Schmidt, & Shultz, 
2008), the nature and direction of these links have remained elusive. Is it possible to assign 
causal or predictive priority to any of these concepts? Are personality traits or values more 
stable and stronger in predicting one another? Do they differ in their effects on well-being 
and self-esteem, and how do these effects come about? These questions are central to 
understanding the composition of personality, but few direct empirical data exist to address 
them comprehensively. The present study addresses this gap by examining the interrelations 
of personality traits, values, well-being, and self-esteem in a nationally representative panel 
in the Netherlands with data from five time points spanning eight years. 
Theoretical Framework 
Two broad theoretical perspectives inform the different approaches to the longitudinal 
relations of personality and values (Bleidorn et al., 2010; Specht et al., 2014). The five-factor 
theory (FFT: McCrae & Costa, 2008; Mõttus, 2017), on the one hand, places the notion of 
biologically given personality traits centrally. A distinction is drawn between basic traits and 
characteristic adaptations, or core and surface personality characteristics (Kandler, 
Zimmermann, & McAdams, 2014). The basic traits (captured in the Five-Factor Model) are 
seen as core personality characteristics that are heritable, temporally stable, relatively 
immune to external influences, and causally prior to surface characteristics. Other aspects of 
personality, such as values and self-schemata, are seen as surface manifestations of the basic 
traits. These manifestations, denoted as characteristic adaptations, are jointly influenced by 
the underlying traits and environmental conditions, and are thus more malleable. The 
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neosocioanalytic theory (NST: Roberts & Nickel, 2017; Roberts & Wood, 2006), on the other 
hand, sees traits, values, and affects as elements of personality at the same level of hierarchy, 
all co-determined by genetic and environmental factors. From this perspective, there is no 
differentiation between core and surface characteristics; there is no clear causal priority of 
traits or other aspects of personality; and all characteristics can change in response to 
environmental demands such as social roles. 
Kandler and colleagues (2014) reviewed published studies on the longitudinal 
stability, causal ordering, heritability, and genetic variance in basic traits, values, attitudes, 
beliefs, self-schemata, and strivings. Overall, this review argued against a sharp distinction 
between supposed core and surface characteristics. For example, some attitudes had similar 
levels of stability as traits, and some of the causal links between traits and the other elements 
appeared to be reciprocal rather than unidirectional. However, the empirical basis of this 
review was rather limited. There were only a few studies that directly compared traits to other 
personality elements in their longitudinal stability and direction of causation, and these 
studies did not involve values but mostly sociopolitical attitudes. In the following sections, 
we review several studies that are relevant, firstly, for the stability and causal priority of 
personality traits and values, and secondly, for their effects on well-being and self-esteem, 
before introducing the present study. 
Personality Traits and Values 
Values, representing abstract and enduring concepts about desirable end states and 
behaviors, constitute an important aspect of the broader system of personality and feature 
alongside traits both in the FFT and NST perspectives. Similarly to trait models (e.g., 
McCrae, R. R., Terracciano, A., & 78 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures 
Project, 2005), there is evidence that the underlying structure of values is largely universal 
(Fischer, 2018; Schwartz, 1992). Personality traits and values have systematic and 
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meaningful relations, established in two meta-analyses: Openness is negatively related to the 
higher order value dimension of Conservation and positively to the individual value of Self-
Direction; Agreeableness is positively related to the higher order Self-Transcendence and to 
the individual value of Benevolence; Extraversion is negatively related to higher order 
Conservation and positively to the individual value of Stimulation; Conscientiousness relates 
positively to higher order Conservation and to the individual values of Conformity and 
Security; Neuroticism, capturing variance in emotional and temperamental aspects, is much 
less strongly related to any value (Fischer & Boer, 2015; Parks-Leduc et al., 2015).  
In a further parallel to traits, values are also generally seen as stable constructs (Bardi 
& Goodwin, 2011). Milfont, Milojev, and Sibley (2016) found three-year retest correlations 
of value dimensions between .58 and .60. These correlations were lower than retest 
correlations obtained for traits (e.g., over .70 in Terracciano, Costa, & McCrae, 2006, despite 
the longer mean retest interval of 10 years); the difference could to an extent be due to 
differences in the reliability of the measures. Dobewall and Aavik (2016) conducted, to our 
knowledge, the only study so far to directly compare the longitudinal stability of traits and 
values. These authors examined the three-year rank-order consistency of personality traits 
and values in about fifty students and found no significant differences between the stability 
estimates of traits and values in either self- or other-reports.  
How do traits and values influence each other? Two possible mechanisms can be 
distinguished in value theories (Schwartz, 1992). On the one hand, values motivate action 
and function as guides for behavior. If a person finds order important, for example, he or she 
is likely to pursue behaviors such as cleaning or order-preserving activities. A sustained, 
value-guided shift in behaviors could over time lead to a corresponding shift in trait level. On 
the other hand, values serve to justify behavior. A person who frequently engages in order-
preserving behaviors, for example, is likely to justify this by emphasizing the importance of 
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order. The relative strength of these two functions can inform theory. While NST predicts no 
systematic difference in the longitudinal effects of traits and values, FFT predicts stronger 
effects of traits on values, which would imply that values serve more to justify than to guide 
behavior. A few studies offer indirect indications on the potential causal ordering of 
personality and values. Lüdtke, Trautwein, and Husemann (2009) found some small effects 
(mostly in the range of .05 to .10) of personality traits on life goals in students across two 
years, but almost no effects in the opposite direction. Differently from the conceptualization 
of values as global and trans-situational life goals (Schwartz, 1992), the life goals examined 
in this study were more concrete personal strivings including intrinsic (e.g., learning new 
things and having committed relationships) and extrinsic (e.g., being famous and rich) goals. 
In a behavior genetic study on an adult sample using two measurement points about six years 
apart, Bleidorn et al. (2010) found that traits had higher heritability than the two broad life 
goals of agency and communion, but the life goals also had some unique heritability variance 
independent of traits. Furthermore, traits as well as agency and communion had significant 
although small (around .10) mutual, genetically mediated effects, suggesting the interplay of 
traits and life goals over time. Finally, Huuskes, Ciarrochi, and Heaven (2013) found small 
(around .10) effects of religiosity values on Agreeableness and Psychoticism, but no effects 
in the opposite direction, in high-school students assessed across two years. 
Although the reviewed studies provided interesting insights, they have several 
limitations. The only study that directly compared comprehensive models of traits and values 
(Dobewall & Aavik, 2016) had a small sample size, reducing power to detect differences. 
Observations have usually been drawn from only two measurement points, typically two to 
three years apart, which may reduce the long-term generalizability of the effects. Finally, 
with the exception of Dobewall and Aavik, the rest of the studies examined various concepts 
related to values, but did not examine values directly and comprehensively. As a result, the 
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empirical basis for broader generalizations on the stability and relative predictive power of 
personality traits and values is rather limited. It is fair to conclude that there has been no 
direct, comprehensive comparison of the long-term longitudinal stability of traits and values, 
and no assessment of their relative causal ordering. This has been repeatedly recognized as a 
major gap in the literature (Kandler et al., 2014; Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008) and is 
addressed in the present study. 
Traits’ and Values’ Relations to Well-Being and Self-Esteem 
An important way to distinguish the position of personality traits and values in the 
broader personality system is by examining their predictive effects on other elements of that 
system, such as well-being and self-esteem. Traits, values, well-being, and self-esteem are 
interrelated components of personality that all exhibit some heritability, stability, and 
predictive validity (Kandler et al., 2014). Both traits and values are usually seen as predictors 
of well-being (Sortheix, & Schwartz, 2017; Steel et al., 2008). The different theoretical 
perspectives assign different causal roles to these personality components. According to FFT, 
the ultimate source for the covariation in personality components is found in the basic traits. 
Traits are thus expected to contribute most strongly to the variability in well-being and self-
esteem. In NST, on the other hand, no assumption is made about causal priorities, so the 
mutual effects between traits, values, well-being, and self-esteem can in principle be expected 
to be similarly strong. Despite the theoretical relevance of comparisons of the predictive 
power of traits and values, research on the effects of traits and the effects of values has 
developed largely independent traditions, which we summarize in the following paragraphs. 
Trait effects. The associations of personality traits with well-being have been 
extensively documented. A meta-analysis indicated that 18% to 39% of variance in different 
well-being aspects can be attributed to the traits of the Big Five model (Steel et al., 2008). 
The reciprocal relations of traits and well-being have also been examined. Soto (2015), for 
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example, described several potential mechanisms that could lead to trait–well-being links in 
both directions. Traits could lead to a change in well-being both directly (e.g., extravert 
people respond more strongly to positive events) and indirectly through behavior (e.g., 
extravert people engage in more social interaction, which generates opportunities for 
inherently rewarding experiences). Well-being, in turn, can also affect personality traits 
through affecting behavior patterns, for example, by freeing up resources for exploratory 
behavior or by reinforcing behaviors that lead to increases in well-being. Soto assessed the 
mutual longitudinal relations of traits and well-being in a representative sample in Australia 
and found that the effects went in both directions, but the effects of traits on well-being were 
stronger. Kandler, Kornadt, Hagemeyer, and Neyer (2015), on the other hand, found only 
longitudinal effects of traits on well-being (not the other way around) in a study of older 
individuals (64 to 89 years old). Kandler et al. attributed their finding to the use of a state-like 
measure of well-being, as opposed to more trait-like measures used in other studies. 
Self-esteem has been found to correlate with both personality traits and well-being 
(Gebauer et al., 2015; Marsh, Trautwein, Lüdtke, Köller, & Baumert, 2006; Robins, Tracy, & 
Trzesniewski, 2001). However, most reported associations are cross-sectional. While a fair 
amount of evidence has been built up for self-esteem’s predictive power for life outcomes 
(Orth & Robins, 2014), the mutual predictive links of personality traits and self-esteem have 
received less attention. 
Value effects. In contrast to traits, where both direct and indirect effects may be 
operating, values’ associations with well-being may primarily be due to indirect effects, 
where pursuing behaviors in line with one’s values promotes well-being.1 A distinction is 
often drawn between “healthy,” growth values such as self-direction and benevolence, on the 
                                                
1 Another type of indirect effect refers to person–environment fit, where values are associated with well-being 
when they are in line with normative values in a group (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). There is no established model 
for person–environment fit analyses in longitudinal data, so we do not consider person–environment fit in the 
present study. 
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one hand, and “unhealthy,” deficiency values such as conformity and power, on the other 
(Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000; Sortheix & Schwartz, 2017). The “healthy” values are expected to 
correlate positively, and the “unhealthy” values negatively with well-being. While the 
findings on the “healthy” values have been consistently in line with predictions, those on the 
“unhealthy” values have been more varied. Sortheix and Schwartz (2017) found positive 
correlations of Openness values and negative correlations of Conservation values with well-
being across 32 countries; however, these correlations were moderated by the country’s 
egalitarianism, so that Conservation values had a positive association with well-being in more 
egalitarian countries. Power was the only value consistently negatively correlated with well-
being (Sortheix & Schwartz, 2017). Finally, it is conceivable that, just as with traits, values’ 
links with well-being are bidirectional, and well-being may strengthen existing values. The 
directionality of these effects has not been examined previously.  
Values’ links with self-esteem have been less explored than those of traits. Lönnqvist 
et al. (2009) found that self-esteem correlated positively with most values, especially self-
enhancement values (e.g., achievement and hedonism), but negatively with universalism and 
tradition across five European countries. Feather (1991), on the other hand, found only 
positive correlations of various values with self-esteem in Australian samples. As with well-
being, it is not known yet to what extent self-esteem affects values or is affected by them 
across time. 
Traits’ and values’ associations with well-being have usually been studied separately. 
Haslam, Whelan, and Bastian’s (2009) cross-sectional study of a student sample in Australia 
is one of the few exceptions. Traits in that study were generally more strongly correlated with 
well-being, although six of the 10 studied values had correlations with positive affect in the 
same range as those of Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness (.20 to .40). No 
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study to date has directly compared the longitudinal effects of traits and values on well-being 
or self-esteem.2  
Aspects of well-being, and self-esteem. Well-being research differentiates between 
affective and cognitive aspects of well-being (Diener, 1984; Schimmack, Schupp, & Wagner, 
2008). Affective well-being reflects the balance of positive and negative affects, and 
cognitive well-being reflects cognitive evaluations of one’s life. Both personality and value 
studies have independently demonstrated the distinct nature of affective and cognitive well-
being. For example, cultural factors moderate the effects of traits (Schimmack, 
Radhakrishnan, Oishi, Dzokoto, & Ahadi, 2002) as well as values (Sortheix & Schwartz, 
2017) on cognitive well-being more than those on affective well-being, suggesting that 
affective well-being may have a stronger biological basis and be less susceptible to external 
influences.  
Where does self-esteem fit in the distinction between affective and cognitive aspects? 
On the one hand, self-esteem is substantially correlated with Neuroticism, pointing to overlap 
in affective content (e.g., Marsh et al., 2006). On the other hand, self-esteem shares an 
element of cognitive evaluation with life satisfaction (Lucas, Diener, & Suh, 1996), evident 
in some of the items used to measure the two constructs (e.g., “I am satisfied with my life” 
from the Satisfaction With Life Scale [Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985] and “On 
the whole, I am satisfied with myself” from Rosenberg’s [1965] Self-Esteem Scale). In a 
meta-analysis, Judge, Erez, Bono, and Thoresen (2002) found that life satisfaction was more 
strongly associated with self-esteem than with Neuroticism. In that meta-analysis, self-esteem 
had a higher correlation with happiness (.51) than with life satisfaction (.35); yet, the same 
pattern was found for the cognitive constructs of locus of control and self-efficacy. In 
conclusion, self-esteem may include both affective and cognitive elements and is thus worth 
                                                
2 Dobewall and Aavik (2016) examined the effects of profile consistency of traits and values across two time 
points on well-being, and found no systematic differences. Profile consistency represents an alternative 
approach to personality assessment, which is beyond the scope of the present study. 
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examining in parallel to purer affective and cognitive measures of well-being. For the 
purposes of the present study, the common element of the well-being aspects and self-esteem 
is feeling well: in general (positive and negative affect), about one’s life (life satisfaction), 
and about oneself (self-esteem). To simplify the presentation, we alternatively refer further to 
well-being and self-esteem jointly as broad well-being.3 
In summary, despite the accumulated evidence on the links of personality and values 
with well-being and self-esteem, there are some important lacunae in this body of research. 
First, there has been no direct comparison of the long-term effects of traits and values on 
well-being and self-esteem. Second, the notion of mutual longitudinal effects between 
personality and well-being (Soto, 2015) has not been extended to values or self-esteem. 
Finally, no study to date has assessed the relative contribution of traits and values to the 
affective and cognitive aspects of well-being. The present study aims to fill these gaps. 
Study Overview 
The present study aims to elucidate the relative position of personality traits and 
values, as well as their links with well-being and self-esteem, within the broader system of 
personality concepts. Using longitudinal data from five measurement points spanning eight 
years in a nationally representative panel, we examine four questions that are fundamental to 
understanding the constitution of personality but which have not been addressed as directly 
and systematically in previous research.  
Research Question 1: Are personality traits or values more stable across time? 
FFT would predict higher stability of traits, and NST would predict no systematic 
differences. The only, probably underpowered, study to compare the stability of traits and 
values found no differences (Dobewall & Aavik, 2016), but the only other study to estimate 
                                                
3 An alternative umbrella term is self-schemata (Kandler et al., 2014). We abstain from this term to avoid 
overlap with other aspects of the self-concept, such as independent/interdependent self-construal, which may be 
less directly related to well-being. 
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value stability found somewhat lower estimates than typically found for traits (Milfont et al., 
2016). So, the relative stability of the two domains has remained an open question. 
Research Question 2: Do traits have stronger predictive effects on values, or values 
on traits? 
FFT would predict stronger effects of traits and weaker or no effects of values, 
whereas NST would predict no systematic differences. Findings from research on life goals 
(Bleidorn et al., 2010; Lüdtke et al., 2009) suggest that stronger effects of traits can be 
expected. 
Research Question 3: Do traits or values have stronger effects on broad well-being? 
In FFT, traits are the primary source of covariation of the different elements of the 
personality system, so they can be expected to be a stronger predictor of well-being and self-
esteem than values; NST, by contrast, would predict no systematic differences. Both traits 
and values correlate with broad well-being, and cross-sectional data suggest that traits may 
play a stronger role (Haslam et al., 2009). Longitudinal effects have remained an open 
question. 
Research Question 4: Is there a pattern of differential relative predictive strength in 
the bidirectional effects of traits-and-broad-well-being compared to values-and-broad-well-
being? 
This question subsumes two subquestions:  
Research Question 4a: In the bidirectional longitudinal effects of traits and broad 
well-being, in which direction are the effects stronger?  
Research Question 4b: In the bidirectional longitudinal effects of values and broad 
well-being, in which direction are the effects stronger? 
The presence of any bidirectional effects involving traits would be more supportive of 
NST than of FFT. However, the relative strength of the effects is also informative. If the 
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effects of traits on broad well-being are stronger than the other way around (as suggested by 
Kandler et al., 2015, and Soto, 2015), and if this difference is larger than the corresponding 
difference in values’ effects, this would be more in line with FFT than with NST, because 
NST suggests no systematic differences.  
We examine Questions 3 and 4 with respect to positive and negative affects, life 
satisfaction, and self-esteem, which allows us to distinguish any differential patterns for 
affective and cognitive aspects of well-being. 
Method 
According to Victoria University of Wellington’s human ethics policy, research 
involving publicly available data, as in the present study, does not require ethical approval. 
Sample and Procedure  
We used data from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) 
panel administered by CentERdata at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. The LISS panel is 
a representative sample of Dutch individuals who participate in monthly internet surveys. The 
panel is based on a true probability sample of households drawn from the population register 
by Statistics Netherlands. Households that could not otherwise participate are provided with a 
computer and internet connection. A longitudinal survey is fielded in the panel every year, 
covering many domains.4 
                                                
4 Different studies have used data from the LISS panel that partially overlap with the present data. We are aware 
of the following publications: (1) He and Van de Vijver (2015) examined the links between the general factors 
of personality and values, on the one hand, and response styles, on the other hand; (2) Hounkpatin, Boyce, 
Dunn, and Wood (in press) compared different statistical models to examine the longitudinal associations of 
personality and life satisfaction; (3) Schwaba and Bleidorn (in press a) examined individual differences in 
personality change in 14 age groups; (4) Schwaba and Bleidorn (in press b) assessed development in personality 
traits in the five years before and after retirement; (5) Schwaba, Luhmann, Denissen, Chung, and Bleidorn (in 
press) analyzed the life-span development of Openness to Experience and its associations with cultural 
activities. The present study has some overlap in content with Hounkpatin et al.’s study. Hounkpatin et al.’s 
analysis of the links of personality and life satisfaction (especially the bivariate autoregressive model, Figure 3) 
is similar to the analysis of personality and life satisfaction in the present study (Figure 4). However, there are 
substantial differences between the two studies. First, the present study has a stronger focus on substantive 
questions, as compared to Hounkpatin et al.’s stronger focus on methodological questions. Second, the present 
study addresses a substantively different and broader question: the conceptual and empirical interrelations of 
personality traits, values, and broad well-being. As a consequence, our analysis of personality traits and life 
satisfaction is part of an extensive set of analyses that include traits, values, and four aspects of broad well-
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We used eight waves of data collected from 2008 to 2015. Measures of the same 
constructs including personality traits, values, affects, life satisfaction, and self-esteem were 
administered in May of each year. Each year, over 8,000 selected household members were 
invited to participate. The number of respondents ranged from 5,159 (in 2013) to 6,784 
(2008), and the response rates ranged from 70% (in 2009) to 91% (in 2013). In 2010, 2012, 
and 2015, the complete questionnaire was only administered to non-respondents of the 
previous year. We hence used data from 2008 as T1; combined data from 2009 and 2010 as 
T2; 2011 and 2012 as T3; 2013 as T4; and 2014 and 2015 as T5. The demographics of 
respondents in the consolidated five time points are presented in the upper panel of Table 1. 
Respondents who participated at all five time points (n = 3,912) did not differ in 
gender distribution from those who took part at fewer time points, χ²(1, N = 11,890) = 0.29, 
ns. Those who participated at all time points were slightly older (M = 50.54 years, SD = 
17.94) than the partial participants (M = 49.70, SD = 18.00), F(1, 11,888) = 5.72, p < .05, η2 
= .00. The education level also differed slightly (LR[4, N = 11,890] = 12.33, p < .05), but not 
in a linear fashion; both the “no completed education” (0.1%, standardized residual = –2) and 
the “university level of education” category (14.3%, standardized residual = –1.57) were 
somewhat underrepresented in the group of all-wave participants compared with the partial 
participants (where the two categories had 0.4% and 15.8%, with standardized residuals of 
1.40 and 1.10, respectively). To handle the missing data across waves, we used full-
information maximum likelihood in our model estimation (Schafer & Graham, 2002), which 
gave us a total sample size of 11,890. 
Measures 
                                                                                                                                                  
being: positive affect, negative affect, life satisfaction, and self-esteem. Finally, the present study uses a 
different statistical model to estimate cross-lagged effects, the random-intercepts cross-lagged panel model, 
described in detail in the Analysis Outline subsection. 
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All instruments were administered in Dutch. We used two parcels for each construct. 
The Spearman-Brown (split-half) reliability indices per time point are presented in the lower 
panel of Table 1.  
Personality traits. The Big Five model was assessed using 50 items of the 
International Personality Item Pool (IPIP), where each of the five domains is measured by 10 
items (Goldberg et al., 2006). The response scale ranged from 1 (very inaccurate) to 5 (very 
accurate). Positively and negatively worded items were assigned to separate parcels per trait. 
Values. A rating-format version of the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS), including 18 
instrumental values (referring to preferred modes of behavior) and 18 terminal values 
(referring to desirable end-states of existence; Rokeach, 1973) was administered. The 
response scale ranged from 1 (extremely unimportant) to 7 (extremely important). Schwartz 
and Bilsky (1990) identified a quasi-universal structure of RVS items in seven countries, and 
we used this structure as a guide for value assignment (similarly to Kasser, Koestner, & 
Lekes, 2002). Specifically, we assigned the individual items (e.g., helpful) to values (e.g., 
Prosocial) based on their location in the majority of countries in Schwartz and Bilsky (1990), 
with ties decided based on the theoretical expectations in that study. We assigned the items 
(listed in Table S1) to seven values (with number of items and one example): Prosocial (8, 
helpful), Restrictive Conformity (4, self-controlled), Enjoyment (4, pleasure), Self-Direction 
(6, creative), Maturity (5, mature love), Security (4, national security), and Achievement (5, a 
sense of accomplishment). The advantage of this a priori assignment is that it allows a 
formally direct comparison of our results with other studies that use a structure derived from 
Schwartz and Bilsky’s (1990) structure. The disadvantage is that the empirical applicability 
of this imposed structure to the data is only partial.5 Items were assigned to parcels quasi-
                                                
5 We also conducted all analyses reported in the present study with an alternative value structure, derived 
empirically from factor analysis (cf. Feather, 1991). This empirical structure differed from the a priori structure 
in that there was no Achievement value, there was a Stimulation rather than an Enjoyment value, and the 
content of the other values overlapped only partially between the two structures. The cross-model correlations 
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randomly (based on odd and even numbers) except for the Prosocial value, where items 
loading on different empirical factors (see Footnote 5) were distributed equally between the 
two parcels. In line with Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) and Kasser et al. (2002), we used raw 
rather than ipsatized item scores.  
Well-being and self-esteem. We examined positive and negative affects as indicators 
of affective well-being, life satisfaction as an indicator of cognitive well-being, and self-
esteem. Positive and negative affects were measured with the 20-item Positive and Negative 
Affect Scale (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Items were introduced with the 
question, “Indicate to what extent you feel, right now, that is, at the present moment…”, and 
response options ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). The item “excited” had 
ambiguous loadings on both the positive and the negative affect dimensions, possibly owing 
to cultural specificities of the translated term, and was excluded from the analyses. Life 
satisfaction was measured with the 5-item Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS, Diener et al., 
1985), with response options from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Self-esteem was 
assessed with the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE, Rosenberg, 1965), with 
response options from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). The odd- and even-numbered 
items of the PANAS and the SWLS, and the positively and negatively worded items of the 
RSE were assigned to separate parcels, respectively. 
Analysis Outline 
To assess the longitudinal stability of traits and values, we used the univariate trait-
state-error model (Kenny & Zautra, 1995). To assess cross-lagged effects, we used an 
adaptation of the multivariate trait-state-error model and the random-intercepts cross-lagged 
                                                                                                                                                  
between the corresponding values ranged from .66 (Enjoyment and Stimulation) to .96 (Restrictive 
Conformity), with a mean of .86. There was one main instance where the results with the empirically derived 
value structure were more intuitive than those with the a priori assignment: See Footnote 7. The results from this 
parallel set of analyses with respect to the research questions (trait and value stability, mutual predictive effects, 
and predictive effects for well-being and self-esteem) were essentially the same, and the conclusions were 
identical.  
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panel model (RI-CLPM; Hamaker, Kuiper, & Grasman, 2015). Specifically, our cross-lagged 
models had the basic structure of the RI-CLPM; in addition, each construct at each time point 
had a measurement part (i.e., a latent factor measured with two parcels). This approach is 
more appropriate than the conventional cross-lagged panel model (CLPM) in two ways. First, 
the measurement part of the model accounts for the measurement errors of the constructs, 
reducing the possibility that results may be affected by the reliability of the measures. 
Second, the autoregressions in CLPM, meant to express the stability of the same construct 
over time, may be inadequate if the construct has a trait-like, time-invariant stability, where 
every person varies over time around the same group means. This can lead to erroneous 
conclusions on the presence, direction, and significance of causal effects (Hamaker et al., 
2015). The random intercepts in RI-CLPMs account for the trait-like, time-invariant stability 
through the inclusion of a global factor extracted from the same construct across time points 
and with all loadings constrained to one. Between-person variance in RI-CLPMs is partialled 
out in the random intercepts, and subsequently the lagged relationships target only within-
person dynamics. Personality traits, values, well-being, and self-esteem are all assumed to be 
trait-like underlying constructs with stable individual differences, where the stability within 
each domain should be accounted for. In sum, modeling the measurement part of each 
construct and the random intercepts affords a more accurate assessment of the longitudinal 
associations between the trait-like constructs of the present study. In order to avoid 
multicollinearity problems, and because our focus was on the cross-lagged effects rather than 
partitioning variance to traits versus states, we did not correlate the time-invariant factors of 
traits, values, and broad well-being, but we allowed correlations between the error terms of 
their respective time-specific latent factors. 
The model types that we estimated are depicted in Figures 1 to 4. The model in Figure 
1 provides factor loadings, denoted as coefficients a, of each time-specific latent factor on the 
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time-invariant latent factor. We refer to these loadings as stability coefficients: Squaring 
these coefficients gives the amount of variance in the time-specific latent factor attributable 
to the time-invariant latent factor (e.g., Prenoveau, 2016). The stability coefficients thus 
represent the long-term stability of personality traits and values (Research Question 1). The 
model in Figure 2 estimates the mutual effects (cross-lagged effects, coefficients b and c) of 
personality traits and values (Research Question 2). The model in Figure 3 estimates the 
relative effects (cross-lagged effects, coefficients d and f) of traits and values on well-being 
and self-esteem (Research Question 3). Although the model in Figure 3 also provides 
estimates of the relative mutual effects of traits-and-well-being as well as values-and-well-
being, we chose to estimate these effects in separate models for traits and for values (Figure 
4, coefficients g and h; Research Question 4). There were three reasons for this choice. First, 
mutual longitudinal effects with well-being have so far only been studied for personality 
traits (Kandler et al., 2015; Soto, 2015), so it is informative to examine similar effects for 
values separately, as a baseline for comparisons. Second, in separate models, the effects of 
traits are not conditional on those of values (and vice versa), so these separate models 
represent the most frequent condition in which effects on well-being are studied; at the same 
time, the parallel study of conditional and unconditional effects allows the identification of 
suppression effects. Third, the separate models allow us to assess the mean effects across 
both matched and non-matched traits and values (matching is described in the Baseline 
Correlations subsection of the Results).  
In the analyses of bivariate and trivariate models, each model was estimated 
separately for matched pairs of traits and values (except for the separate trait and value 
models of Figure 4), and for each of the four broad well-being aspects, where applicable. For 
example, the model in Figure 2 encompasses separate models for each of the four trait–value 
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pairs described in the Baseline Correlations subsection of the Results section and each of the 
four broad well-being aspects.  
We estimated all models in AMOS (Arbuckle, 2014) and evaluated model fit using 
the comparative fit index (CFI, with values above .90 taken as acceptable and above .95 as 
good) and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA, with guideline values of .08 
and .06, respectively; Bentler, 1990; Browne & Cudeck, 1993). We present the results on the 
research questions by listing the means and standard deviations of the effects across the five 
time points. For example, to assess the effect of a trait on a value in the model of Figure 2, we 
present the mean and standard deviation of the four cross-lagged effects linking the five time 
points. The advantage of assessing effects in this way, rather than using only two points or 
setting equality constraints across lags, is the enhanced generalizability, along with estimates 
of variability, of the effects derived from multiple time points.  
Given the large number of models and estimates, we present summarized information 
in the main body of the text and tables. In an online supplement, we present the assignment of 
items to values (Table S1); the means and standard deviations of all parcels (Table S2); and 
the complete fit (Table S3) and parameter statistics (Tables S4 to S8) for all models. 
Results 
Personality Traits and Values 
Stability. The univariate stability models of the five traits and seven values all had 
CFIs of 1 and RMSEAs of .04 or lower, supporting the fit of the models (see Table S3 for 
details).  
The standardized stability estimates averaged across the five time points (Figure 1’s 
coefficients a) are presented in the left panel of Table 2 (for the individual estimates at each 
time point, see Table S4). The stability coefficients were consistently higher for traits (M = 
.86, SD = .03) than for values (M = .72, SD = .01). When converted into variance explained, 
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these coefficients indicate that, on average, 74% (.862) of the variance in the time-specific 
latent factors of traits was attributable to the time-invariant factors, whereas the 
corresponding variance in values was 52% (.722). In response to Research Question 1, traits 
displayed higher long-term stability than values. 
Baseline correlations. To match personality traits and values, we analyzed their 
correlations at T1.6 Agreeableness correlated with Prosocial at .38 (p < .001) and with the 
other values between .08 and .29 (M = .18). Conscientiousness correlated with Restrictive 
Conformity at .39 (p < .001) and with the other values between .13 and .26 (M = .19). 
Extraversion correlated with Enjoyment at .22 (p < .001) and with the other values between 
.03 and .19 (M = .13). Openness correlated with Self-Direction at .27 (p < .001) and with the 
other values between –.09 and .14 (mean of absolute values = .06). Neuroticism’s 
correlations with values ranged from –.01 to –.10, with a mean of –.05. These correlations 
were in line with the previous literature on personality and values (Fischer & Boer, 2015; 
Parks-Leduc et al., 2015). We hence matched Agreeableness with Prosocial, 
Conscientiousness with Restrictive Conformity, Extraversion with Enjoyment, and Openness 
with Self-Direction for direct comparisons. Neuroticism and the values of Maturity, Security, 
and Achievement were not part of matched pairs, but were examined separately in the 
univariate stability models (Figure 1) and the bidirectional models with well-being and self-
esteem (Figure 4). 
Bidirectional effects. The four cross-lagged models of matched traits and values 
(Figure 2) had CFIs of .97 or higher and RMSEAs of .05 or lower, supporting the fit of the 
models (see Table S3 for details). 
The mean cross-lagged effects of traits and values (Figure 2’s coefficients b and c) are 
presented in the right panel of Table 2 (for the individual cross-lags, see Table S5). There 
                                                
6 The obtained patterns were consistent across time points. 
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were significant and sizable effects in both directions. The differences in cross-lagged effects 
between traits and values were more pronounced than the differences in stability. The mean 
effects of traits on values were nearly thrice as large as those of values on traits. To formally 
assess the effect size difference, we used a Wilcoxon test, entering the estimates of all four 
trait–value pairs for all four cross-lags. The value of the Wilcoxon test was –3.52, p < .001. 
In response to Research Question 2, traits had stronger predictive effects on values than 
values on traits. 
Traits, Values, Well-Being, and Self-Esteem 
Effects of trait–value pairs on broad well-being. There were 16 models estimating 
the relative effects of traits and values on broad well-being (four individual trait–value pairs 
by four broad well-being aspects). With the exception of the model for Openness, Self-
Direction, and self-esteem (CFI = .91), CFIs were at .96 and higher; RMSEAs were .04 or 
lower (see Table S3 for details). These indices supported the model fit.  
The mean cross-lagged effects of the matched trait–value pairs on the four broad well-
being aspects (Figure 3’s coefficients d and f) are presented in Table 3 (for the individual 
cross-lags, see Table S6). Both traits and values had significant effects on broad well-being, 
but the effects were most consistent for traits. The Prosocial and Self-Direction values had 
stronger effects on positive affect than the corresponding traits of Agreeableness and 
Openness. In all other comparisons, traits had stronger mean effects than values. Somewhat 
counterintuitively, the Prosocial and Conformity values had a positive effect on both positive 
and negative affect.7 The distinction of broad well-being aspects showed a complex pattern. 
Traits had sizable effects on all four aspects of broad well-being, whereas values had most 
noted effects on positive affect. We compared the size of the effects of traits and values using 
separate Wilcoxon tests per broad well-being aspect, entering the estimates of all four trait–
                                                
7 In this instance, the empirically derived Prosocial value (also defined by 8 items, four of which overlapped 
with the Schwartz & Bilsky [1990] assignment; see Footnote 5) had a more intuitive pattern, with mean effects 
of .08 on positive affect, –.02 on negative affect, and .02 on both life satisfaction and self-esteem. 
TRAITS, VALUES, AND WELL-BEING 
 
22 
value pairs for all four cross-lags. The tests (displayed at the bottom of Table 3) were 
significant at .01 or lower for negative affect, life satisfaction, and self-esteem. In response to 
Research Question 3, on average traits and values had similar effects on positive affect, but 
traits had stronger effects on the other aspects of well-being and on self-esteem. 
Traits’ and values’ bidirectional effects with broad well-being. For traits, there 
were 20 models on the bidirectional effects with well-being (five traits by four broad well-
being aspects). For values, there were 28 models (seven values by four broad well-being 
aspects). The model for Neuroticism and self-esteem was statistically nonadmissible due to 
negative covariances among error components, even after fixing all variances of the error 
components of the two parcels of each time-specific latent factor to be identical, so we report 
results from a model using observed scores instead (CFI = .97, RMSEA = .08). (For the 
model specification, see Figure S1. Neuroticism had Cronbach’s alpha across the five time 
points from .87 to .89, and self-esteem, from .89 to .90. Disregarding this model would not 
affect the overall conclusions.) The models for the other four traits had CFIs of .98 or higher 
and RMSEAs of .04 or lower. The models for values had CFIs of .98 or higher and RMSEAs 
of .03 or lower. (See Table S3 for details.) These indices supported model fit for both groups 
of models.  
The mean bidirectional effects of personality traits and broad well-being are presented 
in Table 4, and those of values and broad well-being, in Table 5; both correspond to Figure 
4’s coefficients g and h, with either traits or values represented by coefficients g. (For the 
individual cross-lags of traits and broad well-being, see Table S7; for values and broad well-
being, see Table S8.) For traits, it was consistently the case that the mean trait → broad well-
being effects were stronger than the corresponding broad well-being → trait effects, with the 
exception of Openness, which had more balanced mutual links with positive affect, life 
satisfaction, and self-esteem. We computed Wilcoxon tests per broad well-being aspect, 
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entering the estimates for all five traits across all four cross-lags. The Wilcoxon tests (bottom 
of Table 4) were significant at .01 or lower for all broad well-being aspects. The differences 
between the absolute values of the trait → broad well-being effects and the broad well-being 
→ trait effects were positive (Difference row of Table 4), indicating that overall, personality 
traits had a stronger effect on broad well-being than the other way around (Research Question 
4a).  
The general pattern for values was the opposite of that for traits. That is, the mean 
value → broad well-being effects tended to be smaller than the corresponding broad well-
being → values effects. The Prosocial and Conformity values now had a coherent pattern of 
positive links with broad well-being, indicating that their links with negative aspects in the 
trivariate analysis with traits may be due to suppression effects. Achievement, on the other 
hand, had a positive effect on both positive and negative affects. The Wilcoxon tests, 
computed per broad well-being aspect for all seven values across the four cross-lags (bottom 
of Table 5), were significant at .01 or lower for negative affect, life satisfaction, and self-
esteem. For these three aspects of broad well-being, the differences between the absolute 
values of value → broad well-being effects and broad well-being → value effects were 
negative (Difference row of Table 5). In sum, with the exception of positive affect, where the 
effects were balanced, values changed in response to broad well-being more than the other 
way around (Research Question 4b).  
It is interesting to note that the differences were larger for the combination of traits 
and affective well-being, and for the combination of values and cognitive well-being and 
self-esteem (cf. Difference rows of Tables 4 and 5). Thus, traits predicted affective well-
being more strongly than they were predicted by it, and values were predicted by cognitive 
well-being and self-esteem more strongly than these broad well-being aspects were predicted 
by values. In summary, in response to Research Question 4, personality traits predicted broad 
TRAITS, VALUES, AND WELL-BEING 
 
24 
well-being more strongly than they were predicted by it, whereas the opposite was generally 
true for values. 
Discussion 
We examined the interrelations of personality traits, values, well-being, and self-
esteem in a nationally representative panel assessed at five time points spanning eight years. 
Both traits and values had considerable stability, but traits were more stable longitudinally 
than values (Research Question 1). Traits and values affected each other over time, but the 
effects of traits on values were stronger (Research Question 2). Both traits and values 
predicted well-being and self-esteem; while their mean effects on positive affect were similar, 
traits had stronger effects than values on negative affect, life satisfaction, and self-esteem 
(Research Question 3). The longitudinal links of traits, as well as those of values, with broad 
well-being were bidirectional. However, the balance of strength was the opposite for traits 
and values: Traits predicted broad well-being more strongly than they were predicted by it, 
whereas broad well-being generally predicted values more strongly than values predicted it 
(Research Question 4).  
The overall results are more in line with FFT (McCrae & Costa, 2008) than with NST 
(Roberts et al., 2008): Traits were more stable than values and were, on average, consistently 
the strongest predictor of the various other elements of the personality system. However, the 
results would not support a strong version of either FFT (which does not allow for external 
effects on traits) or NST (which sees traits, values, well-being, and self-esteem as equally 
basic elements of personality). Our findings are in line with studies that called for the 
integration of the two perspectives (Bleidorn et al., 2010; Fischer, 2018; Kandler et al., 
2014). In integrative models, traits, values, beliefs, narratives, well-being, and other 
personality-relevant concepts are related across time and form elements of a complex system 
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(e.g., McAdams & Pals, 2006). Our findings suggest that traits are a primary driving force, 
but they are embedded in networks that allow for ongoing mutual effects. 
Our results cast light on the nature of the relations between personality and values. 
The two domains have historically developed separately, yet the evidence for their links has 
been mounting (Fischer & Boer, 2015; Parks-Leduc et al., 2015) and there have been 
proposals for their integration into higher order overarching domains (e.g., Strus & Cieciuch, 
2017). The nature and direction of these links, however, have so far been open to conjectures. 
The present findings argue for an unequivocal position on this debate. Although traits and 
values influence each other and may share common motivational bases such as approach and 
cooperation (Fischer & Boer, 2015) or stability and plasticity (Strus & Cieciuch, 2017), traits 
clearly have the leading role in this relationship. The consistent patterns of individuals’ 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (captured in the Big Five traits) shape what individuals find 
important in life (their values) much more than values shape their traits. 
Mechanisms  
How can we interpret the observed differences in predictive power of traits and 
values? To start with some methodological explanations, firstly, the similar reliability levels 
in our study, combined with our latent modeling approach, rule out an artifact of 
measurement accuracy. A second possibility is that the instruments differed in their coverage 
of the respective domains (as reflected by their different length), leaving less room for values 
to unfold their predictive potential. Three points argue against this interpretation: (a) the 36-
item RVS has a similar length as the 40-item Portrait Value Questionnaire which provides a 
comprehensive measure of values (Schwartz et al., 2001); (b) the 8-item Prosocial value scale 
is of similar length as the 10-item IPIP trait scales, yet did not exhibit similar predictive 
power; (c) in the bidirectional models of values and life satisfaction, life satisfaction was the 
stronger predictor despite being measured on a short, 5-item scale. A related interpretation for 
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the stronger effects of traits than values on broad well-being is that trait measures may 
include more affect-related content than value measures. However, the measures of different 
traits vary in their affective, behavioral, and cognitive content. Conscientiousness measures, 
for example, have a minimal coverage of affective content (on average about 6% according to 
Pytlik Zillig et al., 2002), yet Conscientiousness was one of the strongest predictors of broad 
well-being in the present study. As a final methodological explanation, the different effects of 
traits and values could be attributable to ceiling effects in values and a reduced variance of 
value measures. However, the standard deviations of values were similar and actually slightly 
larger than those of traits relative to scale range (Table S2), so variance effects seem unlikely.  
For an interpretation combining methodological and substantive elements, it is 
interesting to consider the role of temporal stability for predictive power. More stable 
variables can be expected in principle to be stronger longitudinal predictors. Our findings on 
the relations of traits and values are clearly in line with this principle. However, the findings 
on values and broad well-being did not follow such a simple pattern. The mean long-term 
stability coefficients of affects and life satisfaction (.68) were slightly lower, and those of 
self-esteem (.74) slightly higher than those of values (.72; see Table S9 for broad well-being 
and Table 2 for values). Yet, broad well-being tended to predict values longitudinally even 
when a well-being aspect had lower long-term stability than a value, as, for example, in the 
case of life satisfaction (with a mean stability coefficient of .68) and the values of Restrictive 
Conformity (mean stability coefficient of .79) and Maturity (mean stability coefficient of .73) 
(see Table 5 for the corresponding cross-lagged effects). Thus, although the long-term 
stability of concepts may make them more likely to be stronger predictors, other factors are 
clearly involved. 
Turning to more substantive interpretations, the differences in the predictive power of 
traits and values could be due to cognitive accessibility. People may be less aware of their 
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values than of their behavior patterns, and may infer their values from their traits. The 
endorsement of this interpretation depends on the conceptualization of traits. While some 
theorists equate traits with behavior patterns (Pervin, 1994), in FFT traits are the abstract, 
hypothetical underlying causes of these behavior patterns (McCrae & Costa, 2008). The 
underlying traits are only inferred from the observed behaviors, and are thus similarly 
inaccessible as values. An alternative interpretation involves the different functions of values 
as guides versus justifications for behavior (Schwartz, 1992). The finding that values are 
predicted by traits suggests that, although values may indeed fulfill both functions, the 
justifying function is stronger than the guiding function.  
As evident from the preceding discussion, our data cannot unequivocally support a 
single mechanism. Furthermore, longitudinal predictive links cannot uniquely identify 
causation. Third variables may be involved, such as common genetic factors. It is worthwhile 
to consider some different types of causation analyses. McCrae and Sutin (in press) 
distinguished between explanatory causes that identify the mechanisms by which two 
phenomena are linked, and practical causes that allow the prediction of a phenomenon. 
Longitudinal models are limited in their ability to identify explanatory causes, but are useful 
for practical prediction within the confines of the examined variables. Despite advances in 
research on volitional personality change (e.g., Hudson & Fraley, 2015), the experimental 
manipulation of traits is difficult at best, or impossible in the FFT framework (McCrae & 
Sutin, in press). As recognized in research on self-esteem, depression, and anxiety, the limits 
of the experimental approach underscore the usefulness of longitudinal data for testing the 
direction of mutual effects between variables (Sowislo & Orth, 2013).  
Well-Being and Self-Esteem as Elements of Personality 
The results on well-being and self-esteem were in line with conceptualizations of 
broad well-being as an integral part of personality, displaying trait-like features and mutual 
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relations with the other personality elements (Roberts et al., 2008; Soto, 2015). The effects of 
traits on well-being were fairly consistent across traits and across affective and cognitive 
well-being and self-esteem (Tables 3 and 4). Well-being research has usually focused on 
Extraversion and Neuroticism and found smaller associations for Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness, and the smallest for Openness (Soto, 2015; Steel et al., 2009). Our 
findings show that all five traits contribute to broad well-being across time. The significant 
effects in both directions are in line with Soto’s (2015) findings and differ from Kandler et 
al.’s (2015) findings, where only traits predicted well-being. Although Kandler et al. 
attributed the lack of effects of well-being to their state-like operationalization of well-being, 
this does not seem to be the critical factor as the measures of positive and negative affects in 
the present study were even more state-focused. Furthermore, Soto’s (2015) study contained 
an unexpected finding that well-being tended to lead to decreases in Extraversion. This was 
not replicated in our data, where the mutual effects of traits and well-being maintained the 
same sign. In sum, it appears that well-being’s effects on traits are less consistent across 
measures and populations than traits’ effects on well-being.  
Values’ links with well-being and self-esteem varied more depending on the specific 
value and specific aspect of broad well-being (Tables 3 and 5), in line with the notion that 
values have a complex relationship with well-being in interaction with contextual factors 
(Sortheix & Schwartz, 2017). The findings included a few counterintuitive effects in the same 
direction for both positive and negative affects. In the case of Restrictive Conformity, it 
appeared that its predictive effects on negative well-being are especially manifested when the 
common variance with Conscientiousness is taken into account. In the case of Achievement, 
the links in the same direction with positive and negative affects could have to do with the 
combination of more intrinsic (a sense of accomplishment) and more extrinsic (social 
recognition) elements, which have opposite associations with well-being (Ryan & Deci, 
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2000). Further research with alternative value operationalizations would help to disentangle 
the effects of these value elements. The main conclusion of interest to the present study is 
that, overall, values had less pronounced effects than traits on broad well-being. 
Areas of distinction between affective and cognitive well-being. Our study furthers 
the understanding of broad well-being by highlighting the differential relations of its affective 
and cognitive aspects, as well as of self-esteem, with traits and values. Traits’ effects did not 
vary systematically between affective and cognitive well-being, underscoring the overall 
consistent predictive role of traits. Values’ effects, on the other hand, were concentrated in 
affective well-being, in line with the value studies that compared affective and cognitive 
well-being (Sagiv & Schwarz, 2000; Sortheix & Schwartz, 2017).  
The most systematic distinction of affective versus cognitive well-being (and self-
esteem, whose pattern here was closer to cognitive than to affective well-being) was observed 
in traits’ and values’ bidirectional links with broad well-being (see Difference rows of Tables 
4 and 5). The patterns for traits and values mirrored each other: The net balance of traits’ and 
affective well-being’s reciprocal effects was larger and positive, whereas the net balance of 
values’ and cognitive well-being’s (as well as self-esteem’s) effects was larger and negative, 
with the other combinations being closer to neutral. This result raises some interesting 
implications. First, in the domain of traits, the relative contribution of traits to well-being 
over time may be stronger for affective well-being (although a similar pattern was not as 
clearly evident in Soto, 2015). Second, in the domain of values, the overall relation is in the 
direction of values changing in response to well-being, and this effect can be located 
primarily in cognitive well-being and self-esteem. This is in line with the conceptualization 
of values as cognitive constructs that facilitate adjustment to environmental demands 
(Schwartz, 1992). This finding suggests that, rather than concluding that there are limited 
associations between values and cognitive well-being (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000), it would be 
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productive to examine effects in the opposite direction, from broad well-being to values. 
Finally, it is interesting to speculate about the long-term associations of all three domains 
(traits, values, and broad well-being). While traits appear to be a primary driver for changes 
in the other personality elements, it is conceivable that values, theorized to serve societally 
adaptive functions (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), drive behavior changes in response to external 
demands, partly channeled through cognitive appraisals of well-being; these changes may in 
turn lead to shifts in trait levels, setting in motion feedback loops between the personality 
elements. It would be interesting for future research to examine such more complex models 
especially in response to important life events and role transitions (e.g., Anusic & 
Schimmack, 2016; Bardi, Lee, Hofmann-Towfigh, & Soutar, 2009).  
In conclusion, the distinction between affective and cognitive aspects of well-being 
can be substantiated on different levels, but one systematic pattern seems to be that over time, 
traits influence affective well-being more than they are influenced by it, whereas values are 
influenced by cognitive well-being and self-esteem more than they influence these aspects of 
well-being. This is an intriguing result highlighting the distinct links of the various 
components of personality, values, and broad well-being. Although the finding was obtained 
in a large, nationally representative sample across five time points and various measures of 
broad well-being, the novelty of the result implies that it will be important for future research 
to replicate and extend the observed patterns. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Rokeach’s (1973) operationalization of values is widely established and formed the 
basis for the currently dominant operationalization in Schwartz’s (1992) model. Still, more 
recent measures based directly on Schwartz’s model have become more prevalent in recent 
years and have often been used in research on personality and values (Fischer & Boer, 2015; 
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Parks-Leduc et al., 2015). It would be informative to examine to what extent the patterns 
found in our study replicate when using direct measures of Schwartz’s model.  
Our study is based on a sample, albeit large and representative, from a single culture. 
To generalize broadly on the interrelations of traits, values, and broad well-being, cross-
cultural research is needed. The relations between personality and values, as well as their 
effects on well-being, are known to be moderated by culture-level factors such as contextual 
threat, individualism, and egalitarianism (Fischer & Boer, 2015; Schimmack et al., 2002; 
Sortheix & Schwartz, 2017). The importance of extending the longitudinal study of these 
elements to cross-cultural comparisons cannot be overstated. 
The impact of life events is another area that has been gaining attention in recent 
research on both personality traits and values (Anusic & Schimmack, 2016; Bardi, 2009). A 
comparison between the two domains in their flexibility in reacting to life events would 
further clarify their respective roles in the broader personality system. Finally, it would be 
interesting to examine to what extent the observed patterns hold across different age groups. 
Conclusion 
Using an eight-year longitudinal, nationally representative sample, we found that 
personality traits were more stable than values; predicted values more strongly than they were 
predicted by them; offered a generally stronger prediction than values of broad well-being; 
and influenced broad well-being more than they were influenced by it, whereas the opposite 
was true for values. Across the board, these results support theories, such as FFT, that place 
traits centrally in the broader personality system. At the same time, the links between traits, 
values, and broad well-being were bidirectional in line with theories, such as NST, that view 
traits and other personality elements as adaptable and mutually constitutive. The balance of 
results calls for new theoretical approaches that accommodate both the central position of 
traits and their reciprocal links with other elements of personality. 
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Table 1 
Demographics and Scale Reliabilities Across Time Points 
 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
Demographics      
  Number of Participants 6,784 7,021 6,738 5,159 6,918 
  Mean Age in Years (SD) 45.84 
(15.96) 
46.75 
(17.37) 
48.29 
(17.60) 
50.81 
(17.72) 
48.58 
(18.22) 
  Age Range in Years 16–94 14–95 15–97 15–93 15–96 
  Education (Percentage)      
    None Completed 1 0 0 0 0 
    Primary 4 4 3 4 3 
    Secondary 59 58 58 58 53 
    Higher vocational 26 25 25 26 28 
    University 11 12 13 13 16 
  Females (Percentage) 54 54 54 54 54 
Reliability (Spearman-Brown)      
  Personality Traits      
    Agreeableness .71 .72 .73 .73 .74 
    Conscientiousness .67 .68 .67 .67 .68 
    Extraversion .83 .82 .83 .84 .84 
    Openness .65 .63 .64 .63 .65 
    Neuroticism .75 .74 .75 .75 .77 
  Values      
    Prosocial .83 .83 .83 .82 .82 
    Restrictive Conformity .79 .79 .78 .77 .78 
    Enjoyment .77 .77 .78 .78 .77 
    Self-Direction .79 .80 .80 .79 .79 
    Maturity .70 .68 .69 .68 .69 
    Security .72 .71 .71 .67 .71 
    Achievement .66 .66 .67 .67 .68 
  Well-Being      
    Positive Affect .91 .91 .91 .91 .92 
    Negative Affect .93 .94 .94 .95 .94 
    Life Satisfaction .89 .90 .91 .90 .91 
  Self-Esteem .78 .77 .80 .81 .81 
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Table 2 
Mean Standardized Stability Coefficients and Cross-Lagged Effects of Personality Traits and 
Values Across Time Points 
 
 Stability Coefficients  Cross-Lagged Effects 
 Trait  Value  Trait → Value  Value → Trait 
Trait––Value M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
  Agreeableness––Prosocial .80 .04  .71 .01  .35(4/-/-) .02  .11(4/-/-) .04 
  Conscientiousness––Conformity .85 .02  .79 .01  .28(4/-/-) .02  .12(4/-/-) .05 
  Extraversion––Enjoyment .86 .04  .69 .01  .16(4/-/-) .01  .05(4/-/-) .02 
  Openness––Self-Direction .94 .01  .67 .01  .22(4/-/-) .02  .07(3/1/-) .03 
  Neuroticism–– .83 .03          
  ––Maturity    .73 .01       
  ––Security    .71 .02       
  ––Achievement    .72 .03       
Mean .86 .03  .72 .01  .25 .02  .09 .04 
 
Note. Conformity = Restrictive Conformity. Stability coefficients are from univariate trait-
state-error models computed separately for each trait and value (Figure 1, paths a). Cross-
lagged effects are from random-intercepts cross-lagged panel models computed separately for 
each trait–value pair (Figure 2, paths b and c). The superscript numbers indicate number of 
significant effects at .001, .01, and .05, respectively, across the four cross-lagged effects.  
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Table 3 
Mean Standardized Cross-Lagged Effects of Matched Personality Traits and Values on Well-
Being/Self-Esteem Across Time Points  
 
 Positive 
Affect 
 Negative 
Affect 
 Life 
Satisfaction 
  
Self-Esteem 
Dimension M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Agreeableness .07(4/-/-) .01  -.15(4/-/-) .02  .07(4/-/-) .02  .10(4/-/-) .02 
Prosocial .09(4/-/-) .02  .03(-/3/-) .01  .01(-/-/1) .01  .00(-/-/-) .01 
            
Conscientiousness .15(4/-/-) .03  -.25(4/-/-) .02  .10(4/-/-) .00  .24(4/-/-) .03 
Conformity .10(4/-/-) .01  .08(4/-/-) .02  -.01(-/-/-) .01  -.04(3/1/-) .01 
            
Extraversion .14(4/-/-) .02  -.05(3/1/-) .01  .10(4/-/-) .01  .12(4/-/-) .02 
Enjoyment .06(4/-/-) .01  -.02(-/-/-) .01  .01(-/1/-) .01  .02(-/-/1) .03 
            
Openness .04(2/-/1) .02  -.13(4/-/-) .01  .03(2/1/-) .01  .12(4/-/-) .02 
Self-Direction .12(4/-/-) .03  .00(-/-/-) .01  .01(-/1/-) .01  .01(-/1/-) .02 
            
Mean (Absolute)            
Traits .10 .02  .14 .02  .07 .01  .15 .02 
Values .09 .02  .03 .01  .01 .01  .02 .01 
            
Wilcoxon Test -0.65  -3.52***  -3.47**  -3.52*** 
Note. Conformity = Restrictive Conformity. The table presents the mean effects d and f from 
the model in Figure 3. The superscript numbers indicate number of significant effects at .001, 
.01, and .05, respectively, across the four cross-lags. The “Mean (Absolute)” rows display the 
means of the absolute values of mean effects and standard deviations across the four traits and 
values, respectively. The Wilcoxon Signed Ranked Tests were computed using the 
coefficients for all four cross-lags per trait–value pair.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 4 
Mean Standardized Cross-Lagged Effects of Personality Traits and Well-Being/Self-Esteem 
Across Time Points 
 
 Positive 
Affect 
 Negative 
Affect 
 Life 
Satisfaction 
  
Self-Esteem 
Dimension M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Agreeableness            
  Trait → W/S .11(4/-/-) .01  -.13(4/-/-) .02  .08(4/-/-) .02  .12(4/-/-) .02 
  W/S → Trait .08(4/-/-) .03  -.07(4/-/-) .00  .05(4/-/-) .01  .10(4/-/-) .00 
Conscientiousness             
  Trait → W/S .18(4/-/-) .02  -.22(4/-/-) .02  .11(4/-/-) .01  .23(4/-/-) .02 
  W/S → Trait .08(4/-/-) .03  -.10(4/-/-) .01  .08(4/-/-) .01  .19(4/-/-) .02 
Extraversion             
  Trait → W/S .16(4/-/-) .02  -.06(4/-/-) .01  .10(4/-/-) .01  .15(4/-/-) .01 
  W/S → Trait .06(4/-/-) .02  -.03(3/1/-) .01  .06(4/-/-) .01  .12(4/-/-) .02 
Openness            
  Trait → W/S .06(3/1/-) .02  -.13(4/-/-) .01  .04(2/2/-) .01  .13(4/-/-) .02 
  W/S → Trait .06(4/-/-) .02  -.05(4/-/-) .01  .05(2/1/-) .02  .13(4/-/-) .02 
Neuroticism            
  Trait → W/S -.15(4/-/-) .01  .31(4/-/-) .01  -.26(4/-/-) .02  -.25(4/-/-)a .02a 
  W/S → Trait -.09(4/-/-) .01  .12(4/-/-) .02  -.17(4/-/-) .04  -.21(4/-/-)a .01a 
Mean (Absolute)            
  Trait → W/S .13 .01  .17 .01  .12 .01  .17 .02 
  W/S → Trait .07 .02  .07 .01  .08 .02  .15 .01 
Difference .06   .09   .04   .02  
	            
Wilcoxon Test	 -3.57***  -3.92***  -3.49***  -3.27** 
 
Note. W/S = Well-Being/Self-Esteem. The table presents the mean effects g and h from the 
model in Figure 4 (for traits–well-being/self-esteem models). The superscript numbers 
indicate number of significant effects at .001, .01, and .05, respectively, across the four cross-
lags. The “Mean (Absolute)” rows display the means of the absolute values of mean effects 
and standard deviations across the five traits. The Wilcoxon Signed Ranked Tests were 
computed using the coefficients for all four cross-lags per trait–well-being/self-esteem pair. 
aThe estimates for the Neuroticism–Self Esteem model are from analyses of observed scores 
because the model using latent scores was nonadmissible (see text).  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 5 
Mean Standardized Cross-Lagged Effects of Values and Well-Being/Self-Esteem Across Time 
Points  
 
 Positive 
Affect 
 Negative 
Affect 
 Life 
Satisfaction 
  
Self-Esteem 
Dimension M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Prosocial            
  Value → W/S .12(4/-/-) .02  -.05(4/-/-) .01  .04(2/1/1) .02  .05(3/1/-) .01 
  W/S → Value .13(4/-/-) .01  -.07(4/-/-) .01  .08(4/-/-) .01  .14(4/-/-) .03 
Conformity             
  Value → W/S .16(4/-/-) .02  -.01(-/-/-) .01  .03(1/1/1) .01  .04(3/1/-) .01 
  W/S → Value .13(4/-/-) .02  -.02(-/1/1) .01  .07(4/-/-) .01  .10(4/-/-) .03 
Enjoyment             
  Value → W/S .10(4/-/-) .01  -.04(2/2/-) .01  .05(4/-/-) .01  .06(3/-/-) .03 
  W/S → Value .13(4/-/-) .02  -.06(4/-/-) .01  .12(4/-/-) .01  .19(4/-/-) .01 
Self-Direction             
  Value → W/S .15(4/-/-) .03  -.04(2/1/1) .01  .03(2/-/-) .02  .06(3/1/-) .02 
  W/S → Value .17(4/-/-) .03  -.06(4/-/-) .01  .08(4/-/-) .01  .19(4/-/-) .03 
Maturity            
  Value → W/S .15(4/-/-) .03  -.02(-/1/-) .02  .03(2/-/-) .02  .06(3/-/-) .03 
  W/S → Value .16(4/-/-) .02  -.04(2/1/-) .02  .10(4/-/-) .01  .20(4/-/-) .02 
Security            
  Value → W/S .15(4/-/-) .02  -.08(4/-/-) .01  .05(2/2/-) .01  .08(3/1/-) .03 
  W/S → Value .17(4/-/-) .04  -.10(4/-/-) .02  .12(4/-/-) .01  .21(4/-/-) .05 
Achievement            
  Value → W/S .16(4/-/-) .03  .05(3/1/-) .01  .03(1/1/1) .02  .03(1/-/2) .02 
  W/S → Value .12(4/-/-) .03  .03(1/1/1) .02  .06(4/-/-) .01  .08(4/-/-) .02 
Mean (Absolute)            
  Value → W/S .14 .02  .04 .01  .04 .01  .05 .02 
  W/S → Value .14 .02  .05 .02  .09 .01  .16 .03 
Difference .00   -.01   -.05   -.10  
	            
Wilcoxon Test	 0.34  2.64**  4.62***  4.62*** 
 
Note. Conformity = Restrictive Conformity; W/S = Well-Being/Self-Esteem. The table 
presents the mean effects g and h from the model in Figure 4 (for values–well-being/self-
esteem models). The superscript numbers indicate number of significant effects at .001, .01, 
and .05, respectively, across the four cross-lags. The “Mean (Absolute)” rows display the 
means of the absolute values of mean effects and standard deviations across the seven values. 
The Wilcoxon Signed Ranked Tests were computed using the coefficients for all four cross-
lags per value–well-being/self-esteem pair. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Stability model of personality traits/values. The T/V circles denote the latent factors of individual traits and values per time point; p1 
and p2 denote parcels; paths a denote the loadings of the time-specific latent factor on the time-invariant latent factor, interpreted as long-term 
stability coefficients. Variances of the error components of the two parcels of each time-specific latent factor (e.g., u1 and u2, etc.) were fixed to 
be identical for model identification. 
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Figure 2. Personality traits and values. For simplicity, the parcels are omitted (cf. Figure 1). Paths b and c denote the cross-lagged effects of traits 
and values, respectively, in each trait–value pair. In cases of nonadmissible solutions due to negative covariance among error components, 
variances of the error components of the two parcels of each time-specific latent factor were fixed to be identical. 
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Figure 3. Personality traits, values, and well-being/self-esteem. For simplicity, the parcels and the correlations of the error terms of the latent 
traits per time point are omitted (cf. Figures 1 and 2). Paths d and f denote the cross-lagged effects of traits and values, respectively, in each trait–
value pair on well-being or self-esteem. In cases of nonadmissible solutions due to negative covariance among error components, variances of the 
error components of the two parcels of each time-specific latent factor were fixed to be identical.
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Figure 4. Personality traits/values and well-being/self-esteem. For simplicity, the parcels are omitted (cf. Figure 1). Paths g and h denote the 
cross-lagged effects of traits or values, and well-being or self-esteem, respectively. In cases of nonadmissible solutions due to negative 
covariance among error components, variances of the error components of the two parcels of each time-specific latent factor were fixed to be 
identical. 
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Table S1 
Value Assignment Based on Majority Results From Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) 
 
Value Item 
Prosocial A world at peace 
 Equality 
 Forgiving 
 Helpful 
 Honest (Sincere and truthful) 
 Loving 
 Salvation 
 True friendship 
Restrictive Conformity Clean 
 Obedient 
 Polite 
 Self-controlled 
Enjoyment Cheerful (Happy) 
 Comfortable life 
 Happiness 
 Pleasure 
Self-Direction Broadminded (Open-minded) 
 Freedom 
 Imaginative (Creative) 
 Independent 
 Intellectual 
 Logical 
Maturity A world of beauty 
 Courageous 
 Mature love 
 Self-respect 
 Wisdom 
Security Family security 
 Inner harmony 
 National security 
 Responsible 
Achievement A sense of accomplishment 
 Ambitious (Hardworking) 
 Capable 
 Exciting life 
 Social recognition 
 
Note. The English back-translation is presented in parentheses, where it did not match the 
original wording exactly.  
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Table S2 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Parcels Used for Each Variable per Time Point 
 
 Time 1  Time 2  Time 3  Time 4  Time 5 
 M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Traits 3.80 0.51  3.77 0.51  3.73 0.51  3.72 0.53  3.75 0.53 
 Agreeableness 1 4.06 0.62  4.04 0.61  4.04 0.61  4.04 0.63  4.06 0.64 
 Agreeableness 2 3.58 0.53  3.56 0.54  3.55 0.54  3.55 0.55  3.57 0.54 
 Conscientiousness 1 3.92 0.72  3.88 0.73  3.89 0.72  3.95 0.71  3.92 0.73 
 Conscientiousness 2 3.46 0.66  3.43 0.66  3.41 0.67  3.38 0.69  3.39 0.69 
 Extraversion 1 3.14 0.71  3.13 0.71  3.11 0.71  3.10 0.72  3.10 0.73 
 Extraversion 2 3.51 0.51  3.49 0.51  3.46 0.51  3.44 0.52  3.48 0.52 
 Openness 1 3.51 0.70  3.48 0.70  3.48 0.70  3.48 0.70  3.52 0.71 
 Openness 2 2.60 0.71  2.60 0.70  2.56 0.70  2.51 0.73  2.55 0.73 
 Neuroticism 1 2.53 0.80  2.56 0.79  2.55 0.81  2.52 0.83  2.57 0.83 
 Neuroticism 2 3.80 0.51  3.77 0.51  3.73 0.51  3.72 0.53  3.75 0.53 
 Mean 3.41 0.65  3.39 0.65  3.38 0.65  3.37 0.66  3.39 0.67 
Values               
 Prosocial 1 6.07 0.84  6.02 0.85  5.92 0.87  5.94 0.86  5.96 0.85 
 Prosocial 2 5.77 0.89  5.68 0.90  5.59 0.91  5.57 0.90  5.62 0.91 
 Conformity 1 5.33 1.21  5.27 1.20  5.22 1.20  5.26 1.17  5.25 1.19 
 Conformity 2 5.44 1.09  5.38 1.09  5.28 1.07  5.30 1.09  5.31 1.10 
 Enjoyment 1 6.11 0.87  6.04 0.88  5.96 0.90  5.92 0.89  5.95 0.90 
 Enjoyment 2 5.80 0.90  5.74 0.92  5.68 0.93  5.63 0.93  5.72 0.93 
 Self-Direction 1 5.45 0.92  5.40 0.92  5.34 0.92  5.34 0.92  5.38 0.93 
 Self-Direction 2 5.64 0.85  5.56 0.86  5.50 0.85  5.50 0.86  5.53 0.85 
 Maturity 1 5.80 0.87  5.75 0.87  5.69 0.88  5.68 0.88  5.70 0.88 
 Maturity 2 5.51 0.97  5.45 0.99  5.37 1.00  5.32 1.01  5.37 1.00 
 Security 1 6.36 0.87  6.29 0.89  6.23 0.91  6.24 0.89  6.24 0.89 
 Security 2 5.85 1.02  5.81 1.02  5.68 1.06  5.71 1.03  5.75 1.04 
 Achievement 1 5.44 0.92  5.39 0.92  5.31 0.95  5.29 0.96  5.34 0.95 
 Achievement 2 4.77 1.18  4.72 1.20  4.64 1.20  4.52 1.23  4.58 1.25 
 Mean 5.67 0.96  5.61 0.96  5.53 0.97  5.52 0.97  5.55 0.98 
Broad Well-Being               
 Positive Affect 1 4.83 1.08  4.70 1.09  4.62 1.10  4.62 1.13  4.62 1.13 
 Positive Affect 2 4.64 1.13  4.52 1.12  4.43 1.12  4.43 1.14  4.47 1.16 
 Negative Affect 1 2.10 1.05  2.13 1.08  2.13 1.11  2.07 1.09  2.14 1.11 
 Negative Affect 2 2.01 1.14  2.04 1.14  2.07 1.18  2.02 1.16  2.09 1.21 
 Life Satisfaction 1 5.05 1.10  5.00 1.13  4.99 1.15  4.99 1.16  4.91 1.18 
 Life Satisfaction 2 5.23 1.10  5.17 1.13  5.15 1.14  5.15 1.15  5.08 1.20 
 Self-Esteem 1 5.74 0.90  5.68 0.90  5.59 0.92  5.60 0.94  5.58 0.94 
 Self-Esteem 2 5.58 1.24  5.53 1.23  5.49 1.23  5.54 1.24  5.50 1.27 
Mean 4.40 1.09  4.35 1.10  4.31 1.12  4.30 1.13  4.30 1.15 
 
Note. Conformity = Restrictive Conformity.
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Table S3 
Model Fit of All Models Presented in the Study 
 
 χ2 df TLI CFI RMSEA 
Univariate Stability (Figure 1)      
  Agreeableness 141.353 15 .987 .996 .027 
  Conscientiousness 86.541 15 .993 .998 .020 
  Extraversion 227.834 15 .986 .996 .035 
  Openness 73.158 15 .994 .998 .018 
  Neuroticism 170.801 15 .985 .996 .030 
  Prosocial  39.164 15 .998 .999 .012 
  Restrictive Conformity 31.325 15 .998 1.000 .010 
  Enjoyment 52.856 15 .995 .999 .015 
  Self-Direction 37.531 15 .997 .999 .011 
  Maturity 13.608 15 1.000 1.000 .000 
  Security 22.170 15 .999 1.000 .006 
  Achievement 32.500 15 .998 .999 .010 
Traits and Values (Figure 2)      
  Agreeableness & Prosocial  954.909 107 .979 .989 .026 
  Conscientiousness & Conformity 2373.862 113 .946 .971 .046 
  Extraversion & Enjoyment 1062.455 112 .979 .989 .027 
  Openness & Self-Direction 553.994 107 .987 .993 .019 
Traits, Values, and Well-Being/Self-Esteem (Figure 3)      
  Agreeableness, Prosocial, & Positive Affect 4213.398 302 .954 .970 .033 
  Agreeableness, Prosocial, & Negative Affect 5093.417 304 .948 .966 .036 
  Agreeableness, Prosocial, & Life Satisfaction 4095.356 303 .957 .972 .032 
  Agreeableness, Prosocial, & Self-Esteem 5508.001 302 .934 .957 .038 
  Conscientiousness, Conformity, & Positive Affect 4973.409 301 .945 .965 .036 
  Conscientiousness, Conformity, & Negative Affect 5331.760 301 .945 .964 .037 
  Conscientiousness, Conformity, & Life Satisfaction 4693.725 298 .949 .967 .035 
  Conscientiousness, Conformity, & Self-Esteem 5836.770 298 .930 .955 .040 
  Extraversion, Enjoyment, & Positive Affect 2746.110 300 .973 .982 .026 
  Extraversion, Enjoyment, & Negative Affect 2231.809 300 .979 .987 .023 
  Extraversion, Enjoyment, & Life Satisfaction 2452.031 299 .976 .985 .025 
  Extraversion, Enjoyment, & Self-Esteem 3612.850 300 .960 .974 .030 
  Openness, Self-Direction, & Positive Affect 2609.644 299 .971 .981 .025 
  Openness, Self-Direction, & Negative Affect 2016.177 299 .979 .987 .022 
  Openness, Self-Direction, & Life Satisfaction 1899.677 298 .980 .987 .021 
  Openness, Self-Direction, & Self-Esteem 3574.638 300 .955 .911 .030 
Traits and Well-Being/Self-Esteem (Figure 4)      
  Agreeableness & Positive Affect 764.736 112 .986 .993 .022 
  Agreeableness & Negative Affect 1194.869 117 .980 .989 .028 
  Agreeableness & Life Satisfaction 612.514 112 .990 .995 .019 
  Agreeableness & Self-Esteem 1682.154 112 .962 .980 .034 
  Conscientiousness & Positive Affect 671.969 112 .988 .994 .021 
  Conscientiousness & Negative Affect 968.884 117 .985 .992 .025 
  Conscientiousness & Life Satisfaction 515.330 107 .992 .996 .018 
  Conscientiousness & Self-Esteem 1571.335 112 .967 .982 .033 
  Extraversion & Positive Affect 1279.835 112 .980 .989 .030 
  Extraversion & Negative Affect 440.127 117 .995 .997 .015 
  Extraversion & Life Satisfaction 895.950 112 .987 .993 .024 
  Extraversion & Self-Esteem 2192.381 117 .962 .979 .039 
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Table S3 (Continued) 
 
 χ2 df TLI CFI RMSEA 
  Openness & Positive Affect 1013.472 107 .982 .990 .025 
  Openness & Negative Affect 1998.792 117 .968 .982 .037 
  Openness & Life Satisfaction 430.287 112 .993 .997 .015 
  Openness & Self-Esteem 1914.334 112 .957 .977 .037 
  Neuroticism & Positive Affect 577.578 107 .990 .995 .019 
  Neuroticism & Negative Affect 411.553 117 .994 .997 .015 
  Neuroticism & Life Satisfaction 998.136 107 .982 .991 .026 
  Neuroticism & Self-Esteem (Observed Scores) 1512.882 22 .921 .969 .075 
Values and Well-Being/Self-Esteem (Figure 4)      
  Prosocial & Positive Affect 968.298 112 .983 .991 .025 
  Prosocial & Negative Affect 767.714 109 .987 .993 .023 
  Prosocial & Life Satisfaction 454.961 107 .993 .996 .017 
  Prosocial & Self-Esteem 953.556 109 .980 .990 .026 
  Conformity & Positive Affect 724.911 108 .986 .993 .022 
  Conformity & Negative Affect 210.511 109 .998 .999 .009 
  Conformity & Life Satisfaction 409.007 108 .994 .997 .015 
  Conformity & Self-Esteem 573.096 108 .988 .994 .019 
  Enjoyment & Positive Affect 672.963 113 .987 .993 .020 
  Enjoyment & Negative Affect 419.505 112 .994 .997 .015 
  Enjoyment & Life Satisfaction 605.159 112 .989 .994 .019 
  Enjoyment & Self-Esteem 1237.368 113 .970 .984 .029 
  Self-Direction & Positive Affect 729.068 109 .986 .993 .022 
  Self-Direction & Negative Affect 230.877 109 .997 .999 .010 
  Self-Direction & Life Satisfaction 402.435 109 .993 .997 .015 
  Self-Direction & Self-Esteem 1080.633 109 .974 .987 .027 
  Maturity & Positive Affect 683.446 107 .986 .993 .021 
  Maturity & Negative Affect 359.505 113 .995 .997 .014 
  Maturity & Life Satisfaction 364.747 107 .994 .997 .014 
  Maturity & Self-Esteem 1079.485 108 .972 .986 .028 
  Security & Positive Affect 885.193 109 .981 .990 .024 
  Security & Negative Affect 349.634 109 .995 .997 .014 
  Security & Life Satisfaction 527.890 109 .990 .995 .018 
  Security & Self-Esteem 860.468 109 .978 .989 .024 
  Achievement & Positive Affect 1273.208 112 .973 .986 .030 
  Achievement & Negative Affect 750.244 113 .987 .993 .022 
  Achievement & Life Satisfaction 568.769 112 .990 .995 .019 
  Achievement & Self-Esteem 1529.254 113 .962 .980 .032 
 
Note. Conformity = Restrictive Conformity.
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Table S4 
Univariate Stability Coefficients for Personality Traits and Values (cf. Figure 1, Paths a, and 
Table 2, Left Panel) 
 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 
Traits      
  Agreeableness .87 .82 .79 .76 .76 
  Conscientiousness .89 .84 .86 .84 .84 
  Extraversion .92 .88 .85 .82 .82 
  Openness .94 .94 .94 .94 .92 
  Neuroticism .86 .85 .83 .80 .80 
Values      
  Prosocial .71 .71 .70 .71 .71 
  Restrictive Conformity .79 .77 .78 .81 .79 
  Enjoyment .71 .70 .68 .68 .68 
  Self-Direction .67 .68 .67 .68 .67 
  Maturity .72 .74 .73 .74 .73 
  Security .71 .70 .69 .73 .71 
  Achievement .77 .73 .70 .71 .70 
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Table S5 
Cross-Lagged Parameter Estimates for Personality Traits and Values (cf. Figure 2, Paths b 
and c, and Table 2, Right Panel) 
 
 Trait → Value  Value → Trait 
Trait–Value Pair Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St. 
Agreeableness & Prosocial           
  Cross-Lag 1 .59 .03 < .001 .32  .10 .01 < .001 .18 
  Cross-Lag 2 .65 .03 < .001 .36  .06 .01 < .001 .09 
  Cross-Lag 3 .58 .03 < .001 .35  .06 .01 < .001 .10 
  Cross-Lag 4 .61 .03 < .001 .38  .06 .01 < .001 .09 
Conscientiousness & Conformity          
  Cross-Lag 1 .56 .04 < .001 .25  .09 .01 < .001 .19 
  Cross-Lag 2 .60 .04 < .001 .28  .05 .01 < .001 .11 
  Cross-Lag 3 .59 .04 < .001 .29  .04 .01 < .001 .07 
  Cross-Lag 4 .60 .03 < .001 .30  .05 .01 < .001 .10 
Extraversion & Enjoyment          
  Cross-Lag 1 .25 .02 < .001 .17  .05 .01 < .001 .07 
  Cross-Lag 2 .24 .02 < .001 .16  .03 .01 < .001 .05 
  Cross-Lag 3 .24 .02 < .001 .16  .03 .01 < .001 .04 
  Cross-Lag 4 .25 .02 < .001 .18  .03 .01 < .001 .04 
Openness & Self-Direction          
  Cross-Lag 1 .29 .02 < .001 .19  .08 .01 < .001 .12 
  Cross-Lag 2 .33 .03 < .001 .21  .05 .01 < .001 .07 
  Cross-Lag 3 .35 .03 < .001 .23  .02 .01 .003 .04 
  Cross-Lag 4 .36 .03 < .001 .24  .05 .01 < .001 .07 
 
Note. Conformity = Restrictive Conformity, SE = Standard error, Unst. = Unstandardized, St. 
= Standardized. 
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Table S6 
Cross-Lagged Parameter Estimates for Personality Traits, Values, and Well-Being/Self-Esteem (cf. Figure 3, Paths d and f, and Table 3) 
 
 Positive Affect  Negative Affect  Life Satisfaction  Self-Esteem 
Trait–Value Pair Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St. 
Agreeableness & Prosocial                    
  Trait → W/S CL1 .23 .04 < .001 .08  -.50 .04 < .001 -.15  .17 .04 < .001 .05  .26 .03 < .001 .12 
  Trait → W/S CL2 .22 .04 < .001 .08  -.50 .04 < .001 -.16  .19 .03 < .001 .06  .26 .03 < .001 .12 
  Trait → W/S CL3 .21 .04 < .001 .08  -.33 .04 < .001 -.11  .18 .04 < .001 .06  .15 .03 < .001 .07 
  Trait → W/S CL4 .14 .04 < .001 .05  -.48 .04 < .001 -.16  .26 .03 < .001 .09  .23 .03 < .001 .10 
  Value → W/S CL1 .15 .02 < .001 .10  .06 .02 .001 .04  .00 .02 .949 .00  .01 .01 .619 .01 
  Value → W/S CL2 .09 .02 < .001 .06  .05 .02 .003 .04  .03 .02 .033 .02  .00 .01 .978 .00 
  Value → W/S CL3 .13 .02 < .001 .08  .02 .02 .226 .02  -.01 .02 .676 -.01  -.01 .01 .660 -.01 
  Value → W/S CL4 .17 .02 < .001 .11  .05 .02 .009 .03  .01 .02 .584 .01  -.01 .01 .274 -.01 
Conscientiousness & Conformity                    
  Trait → W/S CL1 .41 .05 < .001 .13  -.95 .05 < .001 -.27  .28 .04 < .001 .10  .58 .04 < .001 .25 
  Trait → W/S CL2 .36 .04 < .001 .13  -.83 .05 < .001 -.25  .24 .03 < .001 .10  .58 .04 < .001 .26 
  Trait → W/S CL3 .50 .04 < .001 .18  -.76 .05 < .001 -.23  .23 .03 < .001 .09  .49 .04 < .001 .21 
  Trait → W/S CL4 .42 .04 < .001 .16  -.88 .05 < .001 -.26  .25 .03 < .001 .10  .59 .04 < .001 .26 
  Value → W/S CL1 .13 .02 < .001 .11  .12 .01 < .001 .11  -.02 .01 .073 -.02  -.02 .01 .005 -.03 
  Value → W/S CL2 .08 .01 < .001 .08  .08 .01 < .001 .07  .01 .01 .465 .01  -.04 .01 < .001 -.05 
  Value → W/S CL3 .12 .02 < .001 .10  .06 .01 < .001 .06  -.01 .01 .374 -.01  -.03 .01 < .001 -.04 
  Value → W/S CL4 .12 .02 < .001 .10  .08 .02 < .001 .07  -.01 .01 .604 -.01  -.04 .01 < .001 -.05 
Extraversion & Enjoyment                    
  Trait → W/S CL1 .25 .02 < .001 .13  -.10 .02 < .001 -.05  .21 .02 < .001 .11  .21 .02 < .001 .15 
  Trait → W/S CL2 .26 .02 < .001 .15  -.11 .02 < .001 -.06  .19 .02 < .001 .10  .16 .02 < .001 .11 
  Trait → W/S CL3 .21 .02 < .001 .13  -.07 .02 .001 -.04  .16 .02 < .001 .09  .15 .02 < .001 .11 
  Trait → W/S CL4 .27 .02 < .001 .17  -.10 .02 < .001 -.06  .21 .02 < .001 .11  .18 .02 < .001 .13 
  Value → W/S CL1 .10 .02 < .001 .06  -.02 .02 .409 -.01  .02 .02 .242 .01  .05 .01 < .001 .05 
  Value → W/S CL2 .07 .02 < .001 .05  -.02 .02 .250 -.01  .05 .02 .007 .03  .02 .01 .101 .02 
  Value → W/S CL3 .10 .02 < .001 .06  -.03 .02 .196 -.02  .02 .02 .280 .01  -.02 .01 .202 -.02 
  Value → W/S CL4 .09 .02 < .001 .06  -.04 .02 .059 -.02  .01 .02 .783 .00  .01 .01 .361 .01 
Openness & Self-Direction                    
  Trait → W/S CL1 .18 .04 < .001 .06  -.48 .05 < .001 -.14  .08 .03 < .001 .04  .22 .03 < .001 .12 
  Trait → W/S CL2 .18 .04 < .001 .06  -.43 .05 < .001 -.13  .04 .02 .082 .02  .28 .03 < .001 .14 
  Trait → W/S CL3 .10 .04 .025 .03  -.39 .05 < .001 -.12  .07 .03 .007 .03  .22 .03 < .001 .10 
  Trait → W/S CL4 .05 .04 .231 .02  -.40 .05 < .001 -.12  .10 .03 < .001 .05  .29 .03 < .001 .13 
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Table S6 (Continued) 
 
 Positive Affect  Negative Affect  Life Satisfaction  Self-Esteem 
Trait–Value Pair Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St. 
  Value → W/S CL1 .20 .02 < .001 .14  .00 .02 .974 .00  -.01 .02 .636 -.01  .00 .01 .790 .00 
  Value → W/S CL2 .13 .02 < .001 .09  .00 .02 .892 .00  .05 .02 .006 .03  .04 .01 .001 .04 
  Value → W/S CL3 .16 .02 < .001 .10  .00 .02 .847 .00  .00 .02 .871 .00  .01 .01 .713 .00 
  Value → W/S CL4 .23 .02 < .001 .15  -.02 .02 .246 -.01  .02 .02 .315 .01  .01 .01 .375 .01 
 
Note. CL = Cross-lag, Conformity = Restrictive Conformity, SE = Standard error, Unst. = Unstandardized, St. = Standardized, W/S = Well-
Being/Self-Esteem. 
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Table S7 
Cross-Lagged Parameter Estimates for Personality Traits and Well-Being/Self-Esteem (cf. Figure 4, Paths g and h, and Table 4) 
 
 Positive Affect  Negative Affect  Life Satisfaction  Self-Esteem 
Trait Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St. 
Agreeableness                    
  Trait → W/S CL1 .30 .03 < .001 .13  -.40 .04 < .001 -.13  .18 .04 < .001 .06  .29 .03 < .001 .12 
  Trait → W/S CL2 .25 .03 < .001 .11  -.43 .04 < .001 -.14  .24 .04 < .001 .08  .32 .03 < .001 .14 
  Trait → W/S CL3 .23 .03 < .001 .11  -.27 .04 < .001 -.10  .21 .04 < .001 .07  .20 .03 < .001 .09 
  Trait → W/S CL4 .23 .03 < .001 .11  -.39 .04 < .001 -.14  .31 .03 < .001 .10  .27 .03 < .001 .12 
  W/S → Trait CL1 .06 .01 < .001 .12  -.03 .00 < .001 -.07  .02 .00 < .001 .07  .04 .01 < .001 .10 
  W/S → Trait CL2 .03 .01 < .001 .06  -.03 .00 < .001 -.08  .01 .00 < .001 .04  .04 .01 < .001 .09 
  W/S → Trait CL3 .03 .01 < .001 .07  -.02 .00 < .001 -.07  .01 .00 < .001 .04  .05 .01 < .001 .10 
  W/S → Trait CL4 .03 .01 < .001 .07  -.02 .00 < .001 -.07  .02 .00 < .001 .04  .04 .01 < .001 .10 
Conscientiousness                    
  Trait → W/S CL1 .38 .03 < .001 .17  -.71 .05 < .001 -.21  .28 .04 < .001 .10  .51 .03 < .001 .23 
  Trait → W/S CL2 .33 .03 < .001 .16  -.72 .05 < .001 -.23  .31 .03 < .001 .11  .52 .03 < .001 .24 
  Trait → W/S CL3 .44 .04 < .001 .20  -.64 .05 < .001 -.20  .29 .04 < .001 .10  .44 .04 < .001 .19 
  Trait → W/S CL4 .39 .03 < .001 .18  -.77 .05 < .001 -.24  .32 .04 < .001 .11  .54 .04 < .001 .24 
  W/S → Trait CL1 .05 .01 < .001 .11  -.04 .00 < .001 -.12  .04 .00 < .001 .09  .09 .01 < .001 .19 
  W/S → Trait CL2 .03 .01 < .001 .06  -.03 .00 < .001 -.08  .02 .00 < .001 .07  .08 .01 < .001 .17 
  W/S → Trait CL3 .02 .01 < .001 .05  -.03 .00 < .001 -.09  .03 .00 < .001 .07  .09 .01 < .001 .20 
  W/S → Trait CL4 .04 .01 < .001 .08  -.03 .00 < .001 -.10  .03 .00 < .001 .09  .09 .01 < .001 .20 
Extraversion                    
  Trait → W/S CL1 .28 .02 < .001 .15  -.12 .02 < .001 -.06  .22 .02 < .001 .11  .21 .02 < .001 .16 
  Trait → W/S CL2 .29 .02 < .001 .16  -.12 .02 < .001 -.07  .21 .02 < .001 .10  .18 .02 < .001 .14 
  Trait → W/S CL3 .24 .03 < .001 .14  -.09 .02 < .001 -.05  .17 .02 < .001 .09  .18 .02 < .001 .13 
  Trait → W/S CL4 .31 .02 < .001 .18  -.12 .02 < .001 -.07  .21 .02 < .001 .11  .19 .02 < .001 .15 
  W/S → Trait CL1 .05 .01 < .001 .08  -.02 .01 < .001 -.03  .04 .01 < .001 .08  .13 .01 < .001 .15 
  W/S → Trait CL2 .03 .01 < .001 .05  -.02 .01 < .001 -.04  .03 .01 < .001 .06  .10 .01 < .001 .12 
  W/S → Trait CL3 .02 .01 < .001 .04  -.02 .01 .002 -.03  .03 .01 < .001 .05  .09 .01 < .001 .11 
  W/S → Trait CL4 .04 .01 < .001 .07  -.02 .01 < .001 -.03  .04 .01 < .001 .07  .08 .01 < .001 .11 
Openness                    
  Trait → W/S CL1 .23 .04 < .001 .07  -.47 .04 < .001 -.14  .11 .03 < .001 .04  .26 .03 < .001 .13 
  Trait → W/S CL2 .22 .04 < .001 .07  -.45 .05 < .001 -.13  .09 .03 .002 .04  .28 .03 < .001 .14 
  Trait → W/S CL3 .14 .05 .002 .04  -.40 .05 < .001 -.12  .10 .03 .002 .04  .23 .03 < .001 .11 
  Trait → W/S CL4 .15 .04 < .001 .04  -.42 .05 < .001 -.12  .15 .03 < .001 .06  .32 .03 < .001 .15 
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Table S7 (Continued) 
 
 Positive Affect  Negative Affect  Life Satisfaction  Self-Esteem 
Trait Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St. 
  W/S → Trait CL1 .03 .00 < .001 .09  -.02 .00 < .001 -.06  .03 .01 < .001 .06  .08 .01 < .001 .15 
  W/S → Trait CL2 .02 .00 < .001 .05  -.02 .00 < .001 -.05  .01 .00 .102 .02  .05 .01 < .001 .10 
  W/S → Trait CL3 .02 .00 < .001 .05  -.01 .00 < .001 -.04  .01 .00 .005 .03  .06 .01 < .001 .13 
  W/S → Trait CL4 .02 .00 < .001 .07  -.01 .00 < .001 -.05  .03 .01 < .001 .07  .07 .01 < .001 .15 
Neuroticism                    
  Trait → W/S CL1 -.27 .03 < .001 -.14  .67 .03 < .001 .33  -.63 .03 < .001 -.28  -4.08 .17 < .001 -.27 
  Trait → W/S CL2 -.29 .03 < .001 -.15  .64 .03 < .001 .31  -.63 .03 < .001 -.27  -3.91 .18 < .001 -.26 
  Trait → W/S CL3 -.27 .03 < .001 -.14  .58 .03 < .001 .30  -.53 .03 < .001 -.24  -3.60 .18 < .001 -.24 
  Trait → W/S CL4 -.27 .02 < .001 -.15  .60 .03 < .001 .32  -.55 .03 < .001 -.25  -3.52 .17 < .001 -.24 
  W/S → Trait CL1 -.06 .01 < .001 -.10  .07 .01 < .001 .14  -.10 .01 < .001 -.23  -.02 .00 < .001 -.22 
  W/S → Trait CL2 -.04 .01 < .001 -.08  .04 .01 < .001 .08  -.06 .01 < .001 -.13  -.02 .00 < .001 -.22 
  W/S → Trait CL3 -.05 .01 < .001 -.08  .07 .01 < .001 .13  -.07 .01 < .001 -.15  -.02 .00 < .001 -.21 
  W/S → Trait CL4 -.05 .01 < .001 -.10  .07 .01 < .001 .13  -.08 .01 < .001 -.16  -.01 .00 < .001 -.20 
 
Note. CL = Cross-lag, SE = Standard error, Unst. = Unstandardized, St. = Standardized, W/S = Well-Being/Self-Esteem. The estimates for the 
Neuroticism–Self Esteem model are from analyses of observed scores because the model using latent scores was non-admissible (see text and 
Figure S1). 
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Table S8 
Cross-Lagged Parameter Estimates for Values and Well-Being/Self-Esteem (cf. Figure 4, Paths g and h, and Table 5) 
 
 Positive Affect  Negative Affect  Life Satisfaction  Self-Esteem 
Value Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St. 
Prosocial                    
  Value → W/S CL1 .19 .02 < .001 .13  -.06 .02 < .001 -.04  .04 .01 .009 .03  .06 .01 < .001 .06 
  Value → W/S CL2 .14 .02 < .001 .09  -.08 .02 < .001 -.06  .08 .02 < .001 .06  .06 .01 < .001 .06 
  Value → W/S CL3 .16 .02 < .001 .11  -.07 .02 < .001 -.05  .04 .02 .017 .03  .04 .01 .003 .04 
  Value → W/S CL4 .21 .02 < .001 .13  -.08 .02 < .001 -.06  .08 .02 < .001 .05  .05 .01 < .001 .04 
  W/S → Value CL1 .09 .01 < .001 .14  -.04 .01 < .001 -.05  .07 .01 < .001 .09  .12 .02 < .001 .10 
  W/S → Value CL2 .08 .01 < .001 .11  -.06 .01 < .001 -.07  .06 .01 < .001 .08  .15 .01 < .001 .14 
  W/S → Value CL3 .08 .01 < .001 .13  -.07 .01 < .001 -.09  .05 .01 < .001 .07  .14 .01 < .001 .14 
  W/S → Value CL4 .09 .01 < .001 .15  -.05 .01 < .001 -.07  .06 .01 < .001 .09  .16 .01 < .001 .17 
Restrictive Conformity                    
  Value → W/S CL1 .18 .01 < .001 .18  .00 .01 .876 .00  .03 .01 .026 .02  .03 .01 < .001 .05 
  Value → W/S CL2 .13 .01 < .001 .13  -.02 .01 .079 -.02  .05 .01 < .001 .05  .03 .01 < .001 .04 
  Value → W/S CL3 .17 .02 < .001 .16  -.02 .01 .248 -.02  .02 .01 .087 .02  .02 .01 .009 .03 
  Value → W/S CL4 .19 .02 < .001 .18  -.02 .01 .115 -.02  .04 .01 .003 .03  .03 .01 < .001 .04 
  W/S → Value CL1 .14 .01 < .001 .13  -.02 .01 .206 -.01  .06 .01 < .001 .07  .13 .02 < .001 .08 
  W/S → Value CL2 .10 .01 < .001 .10  -.01 .01 .479 -.01  .04 .01 < .001 .05  .13 .02 < .001 .08 
  W/S → Value CL3 .11 .01 < .001 .12  -.03 .01 .019 -.03  .07 .01 < .001 .08  .15 .02 < .001 .10 
  W/S → Value CL4 .14 .01 < .001 .15  -.04 .01 .002 -.04  .07 .01 < .001 .08  .19 .02 < .001 .14 
Enjoyment                    
  Value → W/S CL1 .16 .02 < .001 .11  -.05 .02 .009 -.03  .07 .02 < .001 .05  .12 .01 < .001 .11 
  Value → W/S CL2 .13 .02 < .001 .09  -.07 .02 < .001 -.04  .10 .02 < .001 .07  .07 .02 < .001 .06 
  Value → W/S CL3 .15 .02 < .001 .11  -.06 .02 .003 -.04  .07 .02 < .001 .04  .02 .02 .100 .02 
  Value → W/S CL4 .15 .02 < .001 .11  -.07 .02 < .001 -.05  .06 .02 < .001 .04  .06 .01 < .001 .06 
  W/S → Value CL1 .11 .01 < .001 .15  -.03 .01 < .001 -.05  .09 .01 < .001 .13  .18 .02 < .001 .18 
  W/S → Value CL2 .08 .01 < .001 .11  -.05 .01 < .001 -.07  .07 .01 < .001 .11  .18 .01 < .001 .19 
  W/S → Value CL3 .09 .01 < .001 .12  -.03 .01 < .001 -.05  .07 .01 < .001 .10  .16 .01 < .001 .18 
  W/S → Value CL4 .10 .01 < .001 .14  -.05 .01 < .001 -.07  .08 .01 < .001 .12  .18 .01 < .001 .21 
Self-Direction                    
  Value → W/S CL1 .23 .02 < .001 .17  -.06 .02 < .001 -.04  .02 .02 .280 .01  .09 .01 < .001 .09 
  Value → W/S CL2 .16 .02 < .001 .12  -.06 .02 .001 -.04  .06 .02 < .001 .04  .08 .01 < .001 .08 
  Value → W/S CL3 .17 .02 < .001 .12  -.04 .02 .021 -.03  .02 .02 .256 .01  .04 .01 .006 .03 
  Value → W/S CL4 .25 .02 < .001 .18  -.07 .02 < .001 -.05  .06 .02 < .001 .04  .06 .01 < .001 .05 
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Table S8 (Continued) 
 
 Positive Affect  Negative Affect  Life Satisfaction  Self-Esteem 
Value Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St.  Unst. SE p St. 
  W/S → Value CL1 .14 .01 < .001 .19  -.03 .01 < .001 -.04  .06 .01 < .001 .08  .17 .02 < .001 .16 
  W/S → Value CL2 .10 .01 < .001 .14  -.04 .01 < .001 -.06  .04 .01 < .001 .06  .17 .02 < .001 .17 
  W/S → Value CL3 .12 .01 < .001 .17  -.05 .01 < .001 -.07  .05 .01 < .001 .08  .18 .01 < .001 .20 
  W/S → Value CL4 .14 .01 < .001 .20  -.06 .01 < .001 -.08  .07 .01 < .001 .09  .20 .01 < .001 .22 
Maturity                    
  Value → W/S CL1 .23 .02 < .001 .17  -.02 .02 .347 -.01  .03 .02 .109 .02  .09 .01 < .001 .10 
  Value → W/S CL2 .18 .02 < .001 .13  -.02 .02 .352 -.01  .07 .02 < .001 .04  .06 .01 < .001 .06 
  Value → W/S CL3 .18 .02 < .001 .12  -.01 .02 .818 .00  .02 .02 .298 .01  .02 .01 .182 .02 
  Value → W/S CL4 .27 .02 < .001 .19  -.08 .02 .001 -.04  .07 .02 < .001 .04  .07 .01 < .001 .07 
  W/S → Value CL1 .13 .01 < .001 .19  .00 .01 .590 -.01  .07 .01 < .001 .10  .20 .02 < .001 .17 
  W/S → Value CL2 .10 .01 < .001 .13  -.03 .01 < .001 -.05  .07 .01 < .001 .11  .21 .02 < .001 .19 
  W/S → Value CL3 .10 .01 < .001 .14  -.03 .01 < .001 -.06  .06 .01 < .001 .09  .20 .02 < .001 .20 
  W/S → Value CL4 .12 .01 < .001 .16  -.03 .01 .002 -.04  .06 .01 < .001 .09  .22 .02 < .001 .22 
Security                    
  Value → W/S CL1 .25 .02 < .001 .14  -.11 .02 < .001 -.07  .06 .02 .002 .04  .11 .02 < .001 .10 
  Value → W/S CL2 .21 .02 < .001 .13  -.13 .02 < .001 -.09  .10 .02 < .001 .06  .10 .02 < .001 .08 
  Value → W/S CL3 .24 .03 < .001 .14  -.09 .02 < .001 -.07  .05 .02 .005 .04  .04 .01 .005 .04 
  Value → W/S CL4 .31 .03 < .001 .17  -.14 .02 < .001 -.09  .09 .02 < .001 .05  .10 .02 < .001 .08 
  W/S → Value CL1 .11 .01 < .001 .17  -.05 .01 < .001 -.07  .08 .01 < .001 .12  .16 .02 < .001 .16 
  W/S → Value CL2 .08 .01 < .001 .13  -.06 .01 < .001 -.09  .08 .01 < .001 .12  .18 .02 < .001 .18 
  W/S → Value CL3 .09 .01 < .001 .15  -.08 .01 < .001 -.13  .08 .01 < .001 .13  .19 .02 < .001 .22 
  W/S → Value CL4 .12 .01 < .001 .22  -.05 .01 < .001 -.09  .06 .01 < .001 .12  .20 .01 < .001 .26 
Achievement                    
  Value → W/S CL1 .32 .03 < .001 .19  .12 .03 < .001 .06  .07 .02 .003 .04  .08 .02 < .001 .06 
  Value → W/S CL2 .22 .03 < .001 .13  .09 .02 < .001 .05  .07 .02 < .001 .04  .03 .02 .033 .03 
  Value → W/S CL3 .24 .03 < .001 .15  .09 .02 < .001 .05  .01 .02 .763 .00  .01 .02 .680 .01 
  Value → W/S CL4 .31 .03 < .001 .19  .07 .02 .002 .04  .05 .02 .038 .02  .04 .02 .012 .03 
  W/S → Value CL1 .09 .01 < .001 .15  .03 .01 < .001 .06  .03 .01 < .001 .06  .06 .01 < .001 .07 
  W/S → Value CL2 .06 .01 < .001 .10  .01 .01 .460 .01  .03 .01 < .001 .06  .07 .01 < .001 .08 
  W/S → Value CL3 .07 .01 < .001 .11  .02 .01 .002 .04  .03 .01 < .001 .05  .06 .01 < .001 .07 
  W/S → Value CL4 .09 .01 < .001 .14  .02 .01 .030 .03  .04 .01 < .001 .07  .08 .01 < .001 .10 
 
Note. CL = Cross-lag, SE = Standard error, Unst. = Unstandardized, St. = Standardized, W/S = Well-Being/Self-Esteem. 
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Table S9 
Univariate Stability Models of Well-Being and Self-Esteem (Estimated as in Figure 1) 
 
 Model Fit  Stability Coefficients 
 χ2 df TLI CFI RMSEA  T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
Positive Affect 39.650 15 .998 1 .012  .71 .68 .69 .66 .66 
Negative Affect 46.413 15 .998 .999 .013  .70 .67 .66 .66 .65 
Life Satisfaction 201.714 15 .988 .997 .032  .73 .68 .68 .66 .65 
Self-Esteem 141.353 15 .989 .997 .026  .80 .76 .73 .69 .70 
 
Note. T1 to T5 = Measurement time points. 
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Figure S1. Model for Neuroticism and self-esteem in observed scores. Paths g and h denote the cross-lagged effects of Neuroticism and self-
esteem, respectively. 
[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported online in Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology on Apr 4 2019 (see record 2019-18472-001). In the article, the stability model is referred to 
incorrectly as trait-state error model in the abstract, twice in the main body of the article, and in the 
Table 2 Note. Corrected versions of the fourth sentence in the abstract, the first sentence of the Analysis 
Outline section, and the first sentence of the Table 2 Note are provided in the erratum. The Kenny & 
Zautra (1995) reference has been deleted from the text and References list, and Steyer & Schmitt (1994) 
was added to the text and References list. All versions of this article have been corrected.] 
